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China's Trial By Fire [and] Chinese Collaboration With Japan, 1932-1945

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seem to be colored by the Association's own propaganda. The Association's chief activity was publishing a monthly journal. Following the announcement of Nanjing's most ambitious monopoly plan, the 1935, 6-Year Plan to Eliminate Opium, the Association dissolved itself rather than dishonor the cause by collaboration or futile resistance. The author's treatment of the role of opium in Chinese society is also colored by the claims of anti-opium crusaders. Slack calls attention to the fact that the Anti-Opium Association's archetypal emaciated and jaundiced addict was outnumbered by countless casual and recreational users, implying a much more complex relationship between the Chinese people and opium. Throughout the bulk of the book, however, this complexity fades into the background and all opium smokers are equated with addicts. These problems with locating opium in its social context do not detract from the impressive success of this book in shedding new light on the details of the opium trade and the Guomindang's connection to it.

Indiana University of Pennsylvania

Alan Baumler

Jordan, Donald A.: *China's Trial by Fire: The Shanghai War of 1932*. (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2001), xvii + 309 pp., \$ 65.00. ISBN 9-472-11165-5.

Barret, David P. and Larry N. Shyu (eds.): *Chinese Collaboration with Japan, 1932–1945: The Limits of Accommodation*. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), xv + 290 pp., \$ 45.00. ISBN 0-8047-3768-1.

2001 was a very good year for students of China's 20th century conflict with Japan; two books were published that do a great deal to advance our knowledge of Chinese responses to the Japanese invasion. The first, Donald Jordan's history of the Shanghai War of 1932, is a carefully researched study of that short but bloody conflict that draws upon a wide range of sources: Chinese, Japanese and western military, diplomatic and press reports, memoirs, and League of Nations debates. Its purpose is to revise the tendency within American as well as Chinese scholarship to trivialize the 33-day battle that took place between Chinese and Japanese forces in Shanghai from January to March 1932. In most prior accounts this episode in China's struggle with foreign imperialism is treated as little more than a footnote; our memory of it is apt to fade against the background of the Japanese conquest of Manchuria and the Sino-Japanese war of 1937–1945. Jordan's survey of the field indicates that a few historians have recognized the great significance of the war, but they have been unable to establish precisely why this was so, their efforts being hampered by the paucity of materials other than polemics and political propaganda. Other historians, as recently as the 1990s have clung to the habit of glossing over the 1932 war, minimizing both the scale of the conflict and the Chinese resistance. What we find in Jordan, however, is not only that the Nanjing regime led a spirited campaign to resist a brutal Japanese attack, but that the Chinese military, notoriously divided by factional tensions, was able to achieve a remarkable degree of coordination in the face of its common enemy. On the Japanese side, Jordan sheds considerable new light onto the Japanese decision making process, revealing that Japanese military leaders fanied the

flames of anti-Japanese activities in Shanghai partly in order to divert attention from their efforts to consolidate the Kwantung Army's control of northern Manchuria. Meanwhile, the impact of what the Japanese at home called "the Shanghai Incident" was profound: repercussions over what many people felt to be a premature and overly generous peace settlement were a factor in the political turbulence that brought an end to civilian rule.

The War also foreshadowed developments in modern war yet to come. A crucial blow to the Chinese was delivered by Japanese units that outflanked Chinese lines, demonstrating the obsolescence of positional warfare in the face of a highly mobile mechanized adversary – a lesson that Jordan suggests the German army may have taken to heart as it prepared to maneuver around the Maginot Line in 1940. Moreover, the record of Chinese guerrilla operations hints at the role that guerrilla tactics would play in future East Asian wars, and international revulsion at the behavior of Japanese forces signaled the end of what Jordan calls "old-style imperialism" by placing the war in the context of an emerging internationalism.

The war also had a significant impact upon the conflict between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Guomindang (GMD). The CCP seized upon Nanjing's acceptance of demilitarization in Shanghai for use as a weapon with which to attack the legitimacy of the GMD. Thus, the CCP learned that manipulation of patriotism could be a useful political tactic, one that it still employs nearly seventy years after the 1932 event.

In the light of Jordan's findings, it is no longer possible to treat the Shanghai War as a minor episode in China's clash with Japanese imperialism. Nor can one argue with confidence that the Nanjing regime lacked the resources and political skills to mount a determined resistance campaign. Jordan's book has therefore done much to illuminate this hitherto greatly misunderstood turning point in China's 20th century history.

The second volume is an anthology containing eleven articles on Chinese collaboration with Japanese invaders from 1937–1945. In the concluding essay Odoric Wu summons scholars to utilize the many resources that have been made available since Chinese scholarship was opened to the West following the death of Mao Zedong. The authors of these essays have made a very good start at doing so. In general, they begin from the premise that conventional explanations of collaboration are too simplistic since they tend to place the matter within a framework that admits only two options, one patriotic (and therefore morally correct) and the other an unprincipled betrayal of the Chinese nation. Such "moral binarism," to use Poshek Fu's term, tends to obscure the possibility that collaborators may have acted from a complex mixture of motives. In his analysis of collaboration narratives, Timothy Brook argues that they typically fail to describe the actual practice of collaboration, and that a more insightful approach might be to recognize that collaboration is not necessarily the "exact opposite of resistance." It could in fact be neutral, or even patriotic, and it could emerge through a "dialogic process" involving a combination of tactics. In his exploration of a hitherto neglected subject, the Reformed Government that Liang Hongzhi led from 1938 to 1940, Brook argues that the regime was not merely a puppet (it was, after all, unacceptable to many Japanese). Rather, it was the product of

negotiations by which Chinese factional interests themselves sought to maximize their influence within the collaborationist regime in order to secure control over various resources such as customs receipts, tax revenues, a national bank and financial policies. Similarly, Peter Seybolt's study of county-level politics confirms the impression that at a variety of levels collaborators sought to take advantage of the conflict to advance their goals in local struggles for power and influence. Others found themselves trapped between the Japanese and their domestic enemies. As Marjorie Dryburgh shows, conflict between regional power centers and the Nationalist government gave Japanese militarists ample opportunity to advance their position by playing the interests of one side against those of the other. Incidentally, Dryburgh maintains that it also put regional leaders in a position where they had no choice but to negotiate with the Japanese. Collaboration was therefore inevitable, "not merely a matter of choosing resistance over appeasement."

None of the writers here found evidence to support the claim that Chinese collaborators were attracted to the image of a Co-Prosperity Sphere with Japan as its centerpiece and source of leadership. On the whole, they discovered instead that collaboration tended to be pragmatic rather than ideological. There is also support, however, for the notion that collaboration could, indeed, be a patriotic act. Inevitably, much attention is directed at Wang Jingwei, whose leadership of the collaborationist Nanjing government has marked him as a traitor in the eyes of several generations of Chinese. Revising this interpretation, David Barrett argues that in most respects Wang's regime resembled the Nationalist Government of Jiang Jieshi: collaboration itself was virtually the only issues that set them apart. Wang Ke-wen adds that Wang's collaborationist posture was the consequence of his lack of confidence in China's military. His actual policy was to "resist while negotiating," seeking to promote resistance in the hope that it would strengthen his hand in negotiations aimed at buying time for China to build military and economic strength. Lo Jiu-jung appears to agree in principle but suggests that for many members of Wang's government the decision to collaborate was, after all, more for the sake of their political careers than for anything else.

Lo adds an important dimension to the discussion by differentiating between the motivations of different population groups: in the case of ordinary people collaboration was seldom a matter of choice, for others it was often a decision based on personal or family circumstances that could be political, economic or social. Focusing on Chinese capitalists, Parks Coble argues that while the Japanese need for resources led them to allow some development by Chinese capital, the structure of political and financial arrangements under the Co-Prosperity Sphere left many Chinese businessmen with little room to grow and little to gain by cooperating with the Japanese. Some, however, fared a great deal better. R. Keith Schoppa shows, for example, that native banks in Shaoxing County that had been suppressed by the GMD found within the collaborationist regime an opportunity to thrive. After years during which Shaoxing suffered from GMD misrule, the arrival of the Japanese brought stability and a welcome reprieve from political, economic and social instability. Under such circumstances, collaboration was an act which combined personal self-interest with commitment to

collectivities other than the nation (e.g., kinship, social or business network, or native place). Such collectivities, as Lo Jiu-jung suggests, could impose claims upon a person's loyalty that were at least as potent as nationalism.

As one can see from the brief summary above, the revisionist scholarship presented in each of these volumes opens many new windows onto the history of one of the most turbulent and important periods in modern Chinese history. Jordan's work will probably stand for some time as the definitive account of what will now come to be acknowledged as a crucial moment. Meanwhile, the collection by Barrett and Shyu will be regarded as a path breaking piece, one that does a great deal to move the scholarly discussion of collaboration in a new direction. Both books demonstrate conclusively that there are rich opportunities for new research on pre-Communist China.

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Dryburgh, Marjorie: *North China and Japanese Expansion, 1933-1937: Regional Power and the National Interest*. (Richmond: Curzon, 2000). x + 249 pp., £ 45.00, ISBN 0-7007-1274-7.

Following the consolidation of the Japanese conquest of Manchuria in 1933, ambitious schemers in Japan's Guandong and North China Garrison armies lost little time in undertaking a series of initiatives to detach the provinces of North China from the control of the government in Nanjing. The official Chinese response to these initiatives is commonly regarded as confused and ineffectual – Nanjing toying with appeasement and local authorities with collaboration – until mounting public outrage, coupled with the Xi'an Incident in 1937, forced a new turn in policy. Marjorie Dryburgh reexamines these events through the activities of Song Zheyuan, the foremost military strongman in North China, and challenges the simplifying categories of appeasement, collaboration, and resistance often used to frame the politics of the Chinese response during this era.

Central to Dryburgh's study is the dialectic of region and center. Given concerted Japanese attempts to divide and conquer, along with a history of "warlordism" in North China, this relationship readily lends itself to characterization as a conflict between a narrow regional interest, seduced by the promise of Japanese-guided autonomy, and a larger national interest represented by Nanjing. The author argues, however, that the problem may be better understood as a tension between regional and central approaches to a common goal of securing the nation as a whole against Japanese encroachment. The complex trilateral negotiations and intrigues involving Song Zheyuan, Japanese military representatives, and the Nanjing government provide her with a vehicle to explore the conflict between these two approaches.

Dryburgh acknowledges that Song presented himself as an ambiguous figure to his contemporaries as well as to latter-day historians. On the one hand he enjoyed solid credentials as a Chinese patriot dedicated to the unity of China, and as the result of a valiant effort as commander of the Twenty-Ninth Army in the fighting in Rehe in 1933, was widely regarded as a hero in the cause of resistance to Japan. He did not equate patriotism with allegiance to the Guomin-