An examination of a cross-section of 102 nations reveals marked differences in the performance of their competition policy enforcement agencies. Likely explanatory factors considered include gross domestic product per capita, the intensity of competition, physical size, the level of corruption, national experience with a modern antitrust law and whether the common law prevails. Competition policy agencies operate poorly in jurisdictions characterized by corruption and poor competitive intensity. In fact, differences in levels of corruption and variations in the intensity of competition account for approximately 78 percent of the observed variance in agency performance. Group characteristics, however, vary by region and have varying impact on the observed performance gap. Rather than a generalized approach to the promotion and diffusion of competition policies, our results suggest that distinct policies for each region are likely to be more successful.
Published in Journal of Business & Economic Studies, Spring 2007, Vol. 13 Issue 1, p1-21. Publisher has granted permission to reprint here.
Rodriguez, A. E. and DeNardis, Lesley Ph.D., "Examining the Performance of Competition Policy Enforcement Agencies: A Cross-Country Comparison" (2007). Government, Politics & Global Studies Faculty Publications. Paper 1.