Throughout his later philosophy, Wittgenstein repeatedly asks the following: ”What makes my image of him into an image of him?” (LW1 308).’ “What makes this picture his picture?” (LW1 309). He takes this same question to apply to linguistic utterances: “Isn’t my question like this: ‘What makes this sentence a sentence that has to do with him?’” (LW1 308). This is by no means a peripheral concern of Wittgenstein’s, and in Philosophical Grammar (62), where he first phrases this question, he pronounces: “That’s him (this picture represents him --that contains the whole problem of representation.”
This essay will explore Wittgenstein’s evolving interest in this key problem of representation, his criticisms of certain tempting answers, and his own perspicuous solution.
Weber, Mark E. "Representation and Intention: Wittgenstein on What Makes a Picture of a Target." The Southern Journal of Philosophy 36.2 (1998):289 - 315. doi:10.1111/j.2041-6962.1998.tb01757.x