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LEISURE AND LIBERAL EDUCATION: A PLEA FOR USELESSNESS

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“But what is useless can nevertheless be a power—a power in the rightful sense.”
--Martin Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics

INTRODUCTION

To paraphrase the opening line of a Henry David Thoreau essay, I wish in this essay to speak a word for leisure, for human dignity, and for freedom as opposed to amusement and occupation. Like the philosopher and wilderness trekker from Concord, I want to make an extreme assertion: We have aimed at usefulness long enough, now let us pursue a measure of uselessness. Doing so will not be easy, because in our technological age “uselessness” is thought a sin against the virtue of “practicality.” Thoreau knew the importance of leisure and understood that, without it and its fruits, human life is hollow, infected with ennui, and marked by “quiet desperation.” Consequently, he served as the “inspector of snowstorms and rainstorms,” so he would have leisure to “improve his soul’s estate.” Unlike many of us in the modern academy – students, professors, and administrators – Thoreau had firsthand acquaintance with the value of leisure because he was informed by an intellectual tradition that privileged liberal learning. Although this tradition reaches at least as far back as Plato and Aristotle, it is increasingly under attack in the modern university, even by those of us who are its would-be defenders. The reason is simple – our technological society and its representatives place too high a premium on the values of utility, efficiency, and productivity. Consequently, even leisure must be dedicated to production.

One cannot promote liberal education and ignore the fundamental tension that exists between leisure and utility. “To aim at utility everywhere,” Aristotle writes, “is utterly unbecoming to high-minded and liberal spirits.” Thus, my plea for leisure, for “uselessness,” is a plea for the revitalization of liberal education. It is not enough to ask, as does Nietzsche’s “last man,” “What is love? What is creation? What is longing? What is a star?” and then “blinks.” The “last man” wants what is useful, what affords comfort and security, so when he entertains the fundamental questions pertaining to human existence, he does so without passion and conviction. These questions mean nothing to him, so he “blinks” as though slumber is never far off. But, perhaps the blink signifies more than just fatigue and boredom. According to Martin Heidegger, for instance, the blink indicates that a “glittering deception” has been put into play – one which by tacit agreement of everyone involved remains unquestioned.
The association of liberal education with leisure and with uselessness is hardly a new idea.\(^5\) The charge of uselessness is usually a disparaging one, but it has also been employed to underscore the non-utilitarian nature of liberal education. One of the most comprehensive treatments to date of liberal education’s uselessness is Daniel Cottom’s *Why Education is Useless*. According to Cottom, the uselessness of higher education “... emerges from the despair that eats away at our satisfactions and that questions even our greatest and most pleasing certainties.”\(^6\) Liberal education is useless in the same manner that genuine thinking is useless: it disrupts, it challenges, it undermines, in a word, it questions. It serves as a foil against what Cottom calls the “tyranny of stupidity.” Thus, the uselessness of liberal learning is its “immeasurable value” and the reason why it should be acknowledged and embraced by the academy.

More recently, Stanley Fish has challenged Cottom’s conclusion as a “back-door form of justification” for liberal education. If liberal education is an intrinsic value, it requires no justification beyond itself. “An unconcern with any usefulness to the world is the key to its distinctiveness, and this unconcern is displayed not in a spirit of renunciation ... but is a spirit of independence and the marking of territory.”\(^7\) Despite some of his deliberately provocative assertions, one can nonetheless appreciate Fish’s insistence on the need to differentiate liberal learning from education dedicated to external ends. Liberal learning is characterized by inutility—Fish’s word—or uselessness, which can be traced back to Aristotle’s view that philosophy “exists for its own sake.”\(^8\) The pursuit of such knowledge requires leisure and is for the sake of leisure. This does not preclude the fact that such knowledge may be utilized to achieve any number of desirable ends, but it does mean that it has a value that is independent of those ends.

But how should one respond to the inevitable query from today’s student, “What can I do with it (liberal education)?” Taking a clue from something Heidegger says about philosophy, one might respond by saying, “What can I do with it?” is the wrong question to ask. The right question is, “What can philosophy (or, liberal education) do with me, if I engage in it?” This view targets those few students who can and will avail themselves of the opportunity to find out, because at least those few will experience the freedom associated with liberal learning and will need no further justification. As for those other students who do not enjoy the luxury of leisure today nor have future prospects of it, it is precisely with such students in mind that I am saying professors of the liberal disciplines should teach their disciplines as ends-in-themselves, rather than as means to external ends. Liberal education will not disappear from the academic scene, but we may be in danger of reverting to the elitism that was inherent in the Ancient distinction between the liberal and servile arts. In *The Last Professors: The Corporate University and the Fate of the Humanities*, Frank Donoghue calls attention to a disturbing trend whereby
“the liberal arts education will increasingly become a luxury item, affordable only to the privileged.”

Those not privileged will still be exposed to traditional liberal disciplines—history, literature, and philosophy, for instance—but for the sake of work. This is un tarnished elitism and, if it comes to pass, will leave the majority of university graduates in the position of “slaves” who exist for the sake of others. They will be paid for their labor, but they will nonetheless exist for the sake of the marketplace. The measure of their value will be reduced to what they can do, not what they are.

The struggle within the academy between vocationally oriented education and liberal education has deep historical roots. What is unique to the contemporary scene is not that the proponents of liberal education are losing ground, for they have been losing ground for a long time. Hunger, after all, is a stronger, more compelling motivator than wonder and contemplation. What is prominent in the academy today is that the would-be defenders of liberal learning are now, either surreptitiously or unwittingly, giving ground. This is precisely what we are doing whenever we advance the cause of liberal education by rendering it useful, whenever we succumb to the language of utility and spell out a litany of liberal learning outcomes, including everything from the development of moral character to effective citizenship, and, let us not forget, the ability to think critically.

The purpose of this essay is to encourage liberal educators to stop giving ground, that is, to stop recasting liberal learning as a utilitarian activity in order to meet society’s demand for utility and productivity. There will always be people in the academy who will give lip-service to liberal education and then blink, and, although it is important to call attention to their blink, it is more important that we go about our business of introducing students to liberal learning writ large; that is to say, liberal learning for its own sake and not for the sake of utilitarian ends. If we busy ourselves with only the latter, our students may learn to write, think critically, and communicate effectively, but they will not have access to the only real evidence there is for the intrinsic value of liberal learning, namely, a cast of people whose lives have been and continue to be informed by liberal education. In order to demonstrate the intrinsic value of liberal learning for our students, we ourselves must embrace and model it in our deeds, and this means to acknowledge its uselessness and to cease repackaging it for the marketplace.

While much of the history of our topic has been covered by Cottom and others, consideration of some crucial historical shifts will help us understand how we arrived where we are today. Throughout history, academics in general and liberal educators in particular have had to fend off demands that liberal education be made useful. But history of the topic also teaches that despite the tension between vocational and liberal learning, the
representatives of liberal education have always had a place at the table. Until now, that is. If Donoghue is correct, "professors of the humanities have already lost the power to rescue themselves." Perhaps, but while we still have a place in the modern university we should, as Fish would say, do our jobs. We should represent our disciplines and not some utilitarian reinterpretation of them. Our students deserve nothing less.

LEISURE AND THE UNIVERSITY

Leisure is inseparable from the idea of a university. Indeed, the words leisure and university are virtually synonymous, as the German philosopher Josef Pieper reminds us. The Greek term for leisure is schole, and it is the etymological root of the Latin word schola and the German word schula, both of which, of course, mean school. It is not surprising then that, for Plato and Aristotle, as well as for their medieval counterparts, leisure is associated not with inactivity but with the highest form of activity, that is, with speculative or contemplative thought. Thus, the contrast to leisure is not activity per se, but occupation or employment. For this reason, leisure must also be distinguished from play and amusement, inasmuch as they are in service to occupation and work rather than contemplation. As Aristotle puts it, "We can hardly fill our leisure with play... Play is a thing to be chiefly used in connexion with one side of life—the side of occupation."

A liberal education informs a person in the proper use of leisure. Looking to Aristotle once more, we read in the Politics that "...there are some branches of learning and education which ought to be studied with a view to the proper use of leisure in the cultivation of the mind. It is clear, too, that these studies should be regarded as ends in themselves, while studies pursued with a view to an occupation should be regarded merely as means and matters of necessity." Studies that aim at occupation are intended to put one in possession of things, while the liberal studies and leisure are intended to put one in possession of oneself. The distinction is a crucial one because things have merely a market value, a price, while selfhood and personal authenticity have intrinsic worth and are, therefore, alone deserving of esteem.

Liberal education, as the word liberal suggests, is intimately connected with the idea of personal freedom. For the Greeks, liberal education was thought to be suitable for free men (and women), while training in the mechanical arts or skills was suitable for those whose lives were defined by work. The medieval thinkers, even though they dignified work in a way that Aristotle and Plato did not, nonetheless continued to assign priority to what they called the contemplative life (vita contemplativa) as opposed to the active life (vita activa). The contemplative life is superior and freer because it is neither subordinated nor dedicated to the acquisition of inferior external ends. For Thomas Aquinas, the distinction between the liberal arts and the servile arts parallels the distinction between contemplative and active life and draws on the distinction between intellectus and ratio. Intellectus, or intuitive
knowing, is a form of intellectual seeing; it is receptive insofar as it receives, beholds, and contemplates the highest objects of knowledge, which include the True, the Good, and the Beautiful. In contrast, ratio, or discursive reason, judges and assesses the matters under consideration, collects and interprets data, draws conclusions from premises, etc. Ratio is the basis of scientific knowledge (scientia) and lends itself, by extension, to technological application, while intellectus is the ground of wisdom (sapientia).

With the technological interpretation of modern science, René Descartes, like his contemporary Francis Bacon, challenged the ancient and medieval view that the highest form of knowledge—that which contributed to human excellence—was knowledge for its own sake. In the Discourse on Method (1637), Descartes articulates the principal aim of a scientific method that conjoined him with Bacon and compelled him to reject scholasticism and Aristotelianism. He held in “esteem,” he says, the study of ancient literature, languages, and theology, and, less positively, philosophy but views all of them as having the same underlying deficiency—they all involve speculations that lead to unusable results. The proper end of science is useful knowledge, not erudition. Indeed, the reason he gives for publishing his thoughts on method is that his method of scientific investigation, unlike the speculative philosophy of the past, would make it “possible to attain knowledge which is very useful in life.”

There is no denying that Descartes was correct to condemn the nearly slavish adherence to Aristotelian science that was common at the time, and his primary goal of wanting, among other things, to “free” humanity from “maladies of body and mind” and “infirmities of age” is likewise laudable. Unfortunately, the success of his philosophical program also gave rise to an attitude that has probably done as much to imprison as it has to free us. We cling more tenaciously than ever to the illusion of our own omnipotence. This attitude is glaringly evident in Descartes’ claim that his method would give rise to a practical philosophy that would render human beings the “masters and possessors of nature.” This, of course, is sheer hubris, and, even if we allow that modern technology has indeed given us control over nature, without the moral anchor implicit in the ancient notion of reality, we are denied the means whereby we can regain a modicum of control over our own power to control.

As regards our power to control our exercise of power, we have become increasingly powerless. Thus, the expansion of human power over nature is accompanied by a contraction of our being and intrinsic worth. What is occluded is precisely what gives human beings their worth and dignity, namely, the contemplative and receptive capacities of the human intellect.

But we are getting ahead of ourselves. Despite Descartes’ and Bacon’s technological interpretations of science, liberal education continued to be associated with the idea of human freedom during and after the Enlightenment, for it was believed that only those who can think well and think for themselves enjoy genuine freedom. What good is freedom from physical
constraints and maladies if the mind is shackled due to a lack of cultivation and a preoccupation with mundane affairs? But, more recently, the narrative of emancipation, of freedom, has been challenged by postmodernism. Even here, though, it is noteworthy that Jean-François Lyotard’s observations in The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge (1979) are descriptive rather than proscriptive. Lyotard’s credentials as a postmodern thinker notwithstanding, his break with the tradition, if one may call it such, retains significant ties with the tradition. For example, Lyotard acknowledges, but does not endorse, the view that knowledge is no longer regarded as an end in itself: “The question (overt or implied) now asked by the professional student, the State, or institutions of higher education is no longer ‘Is it true?’ but ‘What use is it?’ . . . ‘Is it saleable?’ . . . ‘Is it efficient?’ . . . What no longer makes the grade is competence as defined by other criteria true/false, just/unjust, etc.—and, of course, low performativity in general.”

It is worth noting that, even though Lyotard does not buy into the cosmology and metaphysics of the ancient and medieval philosophers, he also does not entirely abandon the element of receptivity that accompanied their notion of intellectus, which, as we said, is the highest function of the mind. “Thinking,” he writes, “like writing or painting, is almost no more than letting a givable come towards you.” Or, again, “In what we call thinking the mind isn’t ‘directed’ but suspended. You don’t give it rules. You teach it to receive.” To think is to suffer—to be receptive to that which shows itself, rather than trying to master and control it.

FREEDOM AND THE DIGNITY OF HUMAN BEINGS

The central role of the liberal or liberating arts is to free us, if only for short periods of time, from mundane affairs, from the need to subordinate our lives, wills, and intellects to external demands, from the need—whether real or merely felt—to place ourselves under the sway of the marketplace in order to make a living. After all, human excellence requires more than the material ends that are procured through labor, however important such ends may be in their own right. We are reminded of this in Scripture when we read in the Old and New Testaments that “man does not live by bread alone.” It is to address our higher intellectual and spiritual needs that a Sabbath is necessary, a day of leisure, during which time we can distance ourselves from the menial tasks and affairs of human existence. For the same reason, ancient temples were set-off and separated from places that were dedicated to farming, grazing, and supplying the material necessities of life. Temples were for the veneration of the gods. From a practical point of view, such sites constituted wasted or useless spaces. For similar reasons, Plato’s Academy and Aristotle’s Lyceum were also “unproductive” places. Indeed, in Plato’s Republic, Adeimantus condemns philosophers because they are “useless to the many.” Philosophy, as it is sometimes said, “bakes no bread.” Nor do history, poetry, literature, and the natural and social sciences, at least not insofar as they participate in and
form the core of a liberal arts education. What makes an art or science liberal or illiberal is the end at which it aims rather than the subject matter per se.\textsuperscript{22}

Thomas Merton is correct when he laments that, despite all our talk of freedom, “our civilization is strictly servile.” Why? Because our technological culture is oriented “exclusively to the useful.”\textsuperscript{23} In the end, even human beings are valued not because of what they are but because of their usefulness, which can be measured and quantified, but not esteemed. “It is by means of technology that man the person, the subject of qualified and perfectible freedom, becomes quantified, that is, becomes part of a mass—mass man—whoes only function is to enter anonymously into the process of production and consumption.”\textsuperscript{24} Merton is not suggesting that we should jettison modern technology; even Merton believes that “a technological society might conceivably be a tranquil and contemplative one.”\textsuperscript{25} However, his italics indicate that he was not particularly sanguine about the likelihood of it coming to pass anytime soon, and for good reason.

Before Merton, Heidegger expressed similar concerns when he argued that modern technology reduces everything—including persons—to the status of “standing reserve.” From the perspective of modern technology, human beings are resources, and the activity of thinking aims at nothing more than calculation, manipulation, and production. Even thinking becomes useful and loses its meditative character, which Heidegger tries to recapture with the German word \textit{Gelassenheit}, to let be, to contemplate, to listen rather than to challenge, exploit, and manipulate. Human beings, however, are contemplative beings—something that is largely ignored in modern academic institutions where productivity and utility are the fundamental values. Education and technology are now a couplet, and what is almost never broached is the possibility that technology fosters an attitude that is contrary to the proper end of liberal education. Merton’s antidote against this state of affairs is the rediscovery of the “primary usefulness of the useless.” But who will administer this antidote in the modern university, if not those who profess the liberal disciplines?

To make manifest the essence of a phenomenon, the phenomenological philosopher Edmund Husserl employed the method of free eidetic variation, which harks back to the Greek word \textit{eidos} or idea.\textsuperscript{26} Loosely applying the eidetic method to the notion of a university, we can, for instance, imagine it stripped of its field house and on-campus housing yet it remains a university. stripped of professional and applied studies yet it remains a university. But, if we imaginatively strip it of the liberal studies, the idea of a university evanesces. We cannot imagine a university without mathematics, without physics, without history, literature, philosophy, and the other liberal arts. This does not mean that professional and technical training are unimportant, but it does mean that they are not \textit{essential} to the idea of a university.
In John Henry Newman’s collected lectures on university education, *The Idea of a University*, he uses the word “idea” to underscore his expression of what is essential for a university education, in other words, what a university cannot be without and still remain a university. Newman’s *Idea of a University* addresses many of the issues I have been discussing, e.g., that there is an essential difference between liberal and servile knowledge, that liberal knowledge involves contemplation and thus requires leisure, that liberal knowledge is its own end, and finally, that “A university is . . . an Alma Mater, knowing her children one by one, not a foundry, or a mint, or a treadmill.” In short, a university is not a business, and educators are not production managers. The proper function of a university is liberal education, which means once again that its end—its proper end—is the cultivation of the intellect for its own sake.

It would be naive to think that the educational climate in Newman’s day was significantly different from our own. In fact, *The Idea of a University* explicitly acknowledges and responds to those of his contemporaries who believed, as many people do today, that university education should “issue in some definite work, which can be weighed and measured. . . . they argue that where there is a great outlay, they have a right to expect a return in kind.” This, of course, is the performativity equation to which Lyotard calls attention. These same people, according to Newman, go on to ask “what is the real value in the market of the article called ‘Liberal Education?'” If a meaningful existence could be had by means of productivity and consumption alone, we might well abandon leisure altogether and relieve ourselves (and our students) of the burdens of liberal education. But, if thoughtful people can agree that the good life at its best requires the fruits of leisure and the liberal studies, then what? How do we get past the myopia of the technological world view and the “glittering deception” that asserts the value of a liberal education, while justifying it in terms of occupation?

**CONCLUSION**

Of course, we can no more go back to Newman’s university than we can to the scholastic institutions of the Middle Ages or to the Lyceum of Aristotle, but, fortunately, doing so is unnecessary for genuine participation in the intellectual tradition that privileges leisure and liberal education. Participation requires respect for the past, but participation does not mean recovering and preserving the past as though it were a museum piece. On the contrary, one must appropriate, transform, and advance what has been. A tradition is a living thing. The modern university, insofar as it brings together and pursues what Newman and others considered conflicting educational goals, must find a way to accommodate the internal conflicts and tensions that arise when the modern university seeks to provide undergraduates with liberal education, while also contributing to the advancement of knowledge through
research and publication and satisfying the demands (I hesitate to say “needs”) of our contemporary, technological society.

Interestingly, Newman, I believe, was well aware of the tension that would be generated by these divergent goals and sought to circumvent the problem by proffering the idea of a university that would be free from the demands of the marketplace. “Performativity” would not be the measuring stick of Newman’s ideal university. The tension that follows from the conflicting demands of research and teaching is put to rest by Newman by dedicating the university to the “diffusion” of knowledge, rather than to its “advancement.” According to Newman, “to discover and to teach are distinct functions; they are also distinct gifts, and are not commonly found united in the same person. He, too, who spends his day in dispensing his existing knowledge to all comers is unlikely to have either leisure or energy to acquire new.”

For better or worse, American universities have accepted the challenge of embracing three divergent interests—teaching, research, and professional training, along with public service—and, as a result, it is imperative that we remain mindful of the tension that this threefold task entails and maintain a proper balance. From an administrative perspective, the absence of tension may be desirable because it would make the whole more manageable, but it would also be a sure sign that all of the interests of the university have, in fact, given way to and become dominated by one interest—the interest of the market-oriented, technological society that it serves. Nor is this reorientation of the university a phenomenon that is unique to the United States. Jacques Ellul, one of the most trenchant critics of modern technology, laments that the modern university—by which he means the modern French university—has become a technical school, where students prepare to fulfill a position in technological society. In such an environment, the humanities are considered unproductive unless they are professionalized and/or brought under the umbrella of technology. An oft-mentioned fear is that the university will vanish unless it responds to the demands of technology and the market. Perhaps it is time for those who still believe in the value of liberal education to respond that the university is already in its death throes when it abandons the liberal arts and sciences except for their role as marketable resources. But almost no one in the academy would dismiss liberal education out of hand, so it is not enough to listen when members of the academy praise liberal learning, one must also watch their eyes to make certain they do not blink. For the sake of the university, let us hope that there remain a courageous few who are willing to embrace “uselessness”—a few who still hold and embody the conviction that one is never more active and engaged than when one is doing “nothing,” that is to say, when one is thinking.
NOTES


3 Aristotle, *The Politics of Aristotle*, ed. and trans. Ernest Barker (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1958), 337; VIII. iii. 12. 1338b. Aristotle does not say that liberal persons should avoid aiming at utility altogether, but that they should avoid aiming at utility “everywhere.” The distinction between leisure and utilitarian concerns is not intended as a way of distinguishing between two classes of people, but as a means of distinguishing between two types of human needs and interests.


6 Cottom, *Why Education is Useless*, 204.

7 Stanley Fish, *Save the World on Your Own Time* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 56-57.


12 Aristotle, *Politics*, 335; VIII, iii, 3-4.


Descartes, *Discourse on Method*, 120.

As Anthony T. Kronman notes, “We have a desire for control that can never be satisfied by any degree of control we actually achieve.” See his *Education’s End: Why Our Colleges and Universities Have Given Up on the Meaning of Life* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007), 231.


Ibid., 19.


Ortega y Gasset, for example, distinguishes between physics and biology conducted as rigorous sciences and as cultural disciplines, and, on his view, it is in their latter capacity that they play a pivotal role in the university. See José Ortega y Gasset, *Mission of the University*, ed. and trans. Howard Lee Nostrand (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1992), 65.


Ibid., 76. See also 308 and *Love and Living*, 23.


28 Ibid., 110.

29 Ibid., 5. Cf., however, Jaroslav Pelikan, *The Idea of the University: A Reexamination* (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1992), 80-81 and 121ff. See also Clark Kerr, *The Uses of the University*, 5th ed. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), 206-207. Kerr, who was Chancellor of the University of California, Berkeley, falls somewhere in between Newman and Pelikan, for he acknowledges the advantages of coupling research/publication and teaching for graduate education, but denies the advantages for undergraduate education.


31 I am alluding here to specific observations put forth by Heidegger and Arendt. See Martin Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning)*, trans. Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1999), 87. See *Human Condition*, 324.