

CHAPTER FIVE

Divine Transcendence and Eternity: The Early Lonergan's Recovery of Thomas Aquinas as a Response to Father McCool's Question

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Philosophers and theologians owe much to the dedicated scholarship of Gerald A. McCool, S.J. Reading his *Catholic Theology in the Nineteenth Century: The Quest for a Unitary Method* and *From Unity to Pluralism: The Internal Evolution of Thomism*, one is struck by Fr. McCool's synthetic ability in narrating the emergence, development, and finally decline of Catholic neo-scholasticism. If there is an abiding question in Fr. McCool's writings, it is that posed at the end of the latter study. Stating that both Karl Rahner and Bernard Lonergan were formed by their studies of St. Thomas Aquinas, Fr. McCool adds that both have moved beyond neo-Thomism as they, each in different ways, addressed the question: "How can a philosophy based on the human mind preserve the fundamental meaning of the Christian mysteries when they must be expressed through historically conditioned concepts in a plurality of diverse systems?"¹

This essay takes up this question in the context of Bernard Lonergan's early efforts at "reaching up to the mind of Aquinas."² While Lonergan takes seriously contemporary historical consciousness, with its pluralism of cultures and contexts, he continues to insist upon the dynamic unity of the human mind in its related

and recurrent operations. The unity of intelligence is not surrendered to the plurality of cultures. Quite the contrary: the vast pluralism of cultures and historical epochs is possible only because of the dynamic unity of human intelligence in act. This unity of intelligence in act amid diversity of developments and expressions is something Lonergan learned in reaching up to the mind of Aquinas.³ It is no surprise, then, that for Lonergan there is a profound complementarity between the tasks of recovering the great intellectual achievements of the past (*ressourcement*) and those of responding to the challenges of the present (*aggiornamento*).

What is at stake in Lonergan's study of Aquinas, then, is something far more than a simple historical exercise of interest only to historians of past thinkers who are no longer relevant to today. Indeed, as Fr. McCool has indicated, there is much more at stake in the development of neo-Thomism.⁴ Philip Gleason has recently argued that it was above all neo-Thomism and neo-scholasticism that provided an integrative framework for the expanding institutions of Catholic higher education during the first half of the twentieth century in America.⁵ In this essay I shall reflect on Bernard Lonergan's doctoral dissertation, his earliest major work on Aquinas, now published as *Grace and Freedom*. My concern is with the way Lonergan's reaching up to the mind of Aquinas led him to discover a theoretical approach to theology that contributes to answering Fr. McCool's question on how a philosophy grounded in the operations of the human mind can preserve the meaning and truth of the mysteries proclaimed in Christian doctrine.

Reaching Up to the Mind of Aquinas

Fr. McCool places Lonergan within the context of the transcendental Thomists who were influenced by the Belgian Jesuit, Joseph Maréchal.⁶ At the same time, Fr. McCool acknowledges that Lonergan's work is not simply an application of the transcendental Thomism of Maréchal, but that Lonergan depended upon earlier historical and textual research and was, like Rahner, a "creative and original" thinker whose system is "the result of independent reflection and research."⁷

As a matter of fact, Lonergan was much more strongly influenced by his readings of Plato, Augustine, and Aquinas than those of Maréchal. Lonergan recalled that when he came to hear of Maréchal's approach, he evaluated it as confirming what he was more familiar with — namely, Augustine's key notion of *veritas* and Aquinas' notion of *esse*.⁸ Lonergan's work, like his life, was dedicated to an ever more adequate understanding of both human intelligence and the mysteries of Christian faith. The topic he chose for his dissertation was Aquinas' theory of grace. Setting a pattern for his work, it is a dense and dedicated retrieval of the work of Aquinas that is both rigorously historical and systematically relevant to contemporary issues.

Later published as *Grace and Freedom: Operative Grace in the Thought of St. Thomas Aquinas*, it traces the developments of speculative theology on grace from Augustine to Aquinas, sets out the terms and relations in his notion of operative and cooperative grace, and presents an as yet unsurpassed analysis of Aquinas' theory of causation, operation, divine transcendence and human liberty.⁹ Lonergan was able to disengage the core of Aquinas' notion of causality and divine providence from the medieval cosmic hierarchical shell with which it was often expressed. As a result, Lonergan cut through the enormous difficulties surrounding subsequent theological controversies on grace and freedom. From the voluntarism of Scotus, through nominalism and the disputes on God's grace and good acts (e.g., the Catholic *De Auxiliis* controversy between Banezians and Molinists), to the Enlightenment and modern variations on determinism and decisionism, Lonergan indicated how crucial achievements of Aquinas were ignored.¹⁰

The intellectual breakthroughs that Aquinas effected were neither understood adequately by his contemporaries nor communicated through subsequent commentators. Specifically, such terms as "supernatural," "divine transcendence," and "operation" are used by Aquinas within a philosophically systematic framework that differentiates their meanings from previous usage. So the "theorem of the supernatural" in Aquinas expresses the mystery of redemption as gifting humankind with theological virtues and graces natural to God alone, and so absolutely gratuitous and

supernatural relative to human nature. The theorem referred to the entitative disproportion between nature and grace, reason and faith, good will and agapic love, human honor and merit before God. Some subsequent commentators missed the theoretical framework of the theorem and imagined instead separate realms or planes, one natural and another supernatural. This led to a host of difficulties characterized by supposed contradictions between the supernatural and the natural, grace and freedom, faith and reason.

His doctoral work convinced Lonergan that the task of historically retrieving Aquinas was far more difficult than most modern historians, philosophers, and theologians had envisaged. For what was needed to reach up to the mind of Aquinas was not simply an historical, philosophical, or theological reconstruction of Aquinas' work. What was needed for any of these reconstructions to be accurate was a set of profound changes within the historian, philosopher, or theologian doing the reconstructions.

From Augustine, Lonergan learned that Christian conversion to Jesus Christ as Lord involved not only religious but intellectual and moral dimensions as well. The psychological and phenomenological narratives of Augustine's intellectual conversion to the truth, moral conversion to goodness, and religious conversion to God revealed in Christ Jesus, together with the doctrinal theology of Athanasius, grounded the shift towards theory in Aquinas.¹¹ This threefold conversion process of Augustine is expressed in Aquinas as the fundamental importance of the intellectual, moral, and theological virtues.¹² To understand the systematic breakthrough in the theology of Aquinas, Lonergan realized that he had to reach up to the mind of Aquinas by undergoing himself what he would later term "intellectual conversion."¹³

In *Method in Theology*, Lonergan indicated how a factor establishing continuity in systematic theology is the occurrence in the past of genuine achievement. In this context he evaluated his own early work:

I have done two studies of the writings of St. Thomas Aquinas. One on *Grace and Freedom*, the other on *Verbum*. Were I to write on these topics

today, the method I am proposing would lead to several significant differences from the presentation by Aquinas. But there also would exist profound affinities. For Aquinas' thought on grace and freedom and his thought on cognitional theory and on the trinity were genuine achievements of the human spirit. Such achievement has a permanence of its own. It can be improved upon. It can be inserted in larger and richer contexts. But unless its substance is incorporated in subsequent work, the subsequent work will be a substantially poorer affair.¹⁴

Unfortunately, the serious scholarship on past achievements of the human spirit in systematic theology has declined over the past decades as these achievements were left to historians who had no more than a common sense scholarly grasp of the historical contexts.¹⁵

Even a cursory reading of *Grace and Freedom* indicates the importance of chapter five, entitled "Divine Transcendence and Human Liberty."¹⁶ The young Lonergan was able, in the course of recovering the theoretical achievement of Aquinas on operative and cooperative grace, also to recover Aquinas' differentiated reception of Augustine's and Boethius' masterful reflections on divine eternity.

Fortunately, we now also have available the introductory section that Lonergan wrote to his dissertation, wherein he sets out the theoretical nest of terms and relations central to his study. This long introduction to his dissertation was not published in the book edition of *Grace and Freedom* but has now been published in *Method: A Journal of Lonergan Studies*.¹⁷ There, Lonergan shows how a key task of speculative theology is to understand finite, created realities properly in order that the theologian attain the mystery of God as mystery and not as a problem. This will set the context for reflecting on divine transcendence and divine eternity. In recovering Aquinas, Lonergan analyzes how human intelligence participates in eternal light, then indicates how the divine transcendence of all change is unique to God alone.

Speculative Theology and the Mystery of God

From the first sentence of Lonergan's introduction to his dissertation, it is clear that his reaching up to the mind of Aquinas had achieved something still needed in systematic theology, and as well had cut through the major disputes which had derailed the theology of grace in the intervening centuries:

A study of St. Thomas's thought on *gratia operans* offers a threefold interest. It reveals him working into synthesis the speculative theorems discovered by his predecessors. It brings to light the development of his own mind. It suggests an attitude and direction of thought distinct from the one resulting in the impasse of the controversy *de Auxiliis*.¹⁸

Immediately Lonergan zeros in on the "attitude and interest" that later theologians missed and which he is going to explicate in order to pin down precisely why for so many centuries theologians had been misunderstanding Aquinas, failing to grasp the exact nature of Aquinas' speculative breakthrough. If the interpreter of Aquinas misses that, then Aquinas is simply not understood. The key lies in "an analysis of the idea of development in speculative theology," which both reaches up to the mind of Aquinas, while also attending to "a general scheme of the historical process because the human mind is always the human mind."¹⁹ Lonergan is quite definite that the interest and attitude of Aquinas are precisely in speculative theology. Thus he is not trying to "read into" the texts: "We are not engaged in proposing a theory in speculative theology. We are giving an account of someone else's theories. . . . We ask what he said, why he said it and what he meant in saying it."²⁰

Two extremes are to be avoided. One is a deductive conceptualism in which an *a priori* scheme ignores the historical data, making out what Aquinas "must" have meant by reading back present categories into the past. Lonergan met this attitude too frequently. It was to be found in those theologians who were conceptualist logicians. The other extreme is positivism, which

gives up on the *a priori* altogether by contenting itself to “observe facts” without adverting to the keen intelligence doing the observing. If before Vatican II the conceptualist logicians seemed to predominate in Catholic theological circles, perhaps a type of positivism has been the tendency in Catholic systematics since the council. We have systematic theologies of x, y, or z, but little sense that systematic theology is a discipline that not only can, but should, move beyond the particularities of individual theologians to understand the mysteries of faith, the sacred realities themselves. Lonergan was convinced that positivism could be avoided without falling into an ahistorical conceptualism, to be followed by that form of positivism now current, historicist deconstruction:

It remains that history can follow a middle course, neither projecting into the past the categories of the present, nor pretending that historical inquiry is conducted without a use of human intelligence. That middle course consists in constructing an *a priori* scheme that is capable of synthesizing any possible set of historical data irrespective of their place and time, just as the science of mathematics constructs a generic scheme capable of synthesizing any possible set of quantitative phenomena. In the present work this generic scheme is attained by an analysis of the idea of a development in speculative theology.²¹

He makes it quite clear that he is not speaking of “the development of doctrine,” but of the development of speculative theology: “Speculative deficiency is no proof of heterodoxy.”²²

For the young Lonergan, attending to human intelligence took the form of seeking “a point of vantage outside the temporal dialectic, a matrix or system of thought that at once is as pertinent and as indifferent to historical events as is the science of mathematics to quantitative phenomena.”²³ Such a viewpoint is no more ahistorical than mathematics or physics are ahistorical. To claim it is would be to assert that human intelligence is only historical if it is in common sense patterns of experience. But to exclude the

intellectual pattern of experience from history would deprive history of its most esteemed and exalted characteristic: the dynamic of intelligence in act.²⁴ If the form of speculative theology is human intelligence in act, the content is that intelligence as reflecting on the Word of God down the centuries, where the attention is not to systematic theology *per se* but, as he says, to the “system” in systematic theology.

The young Lonergan calls attention to the immense efforts required as Europeans

emerged from the chaos of a broken empire and the distress of barbaric invasion, and gave their leisure to the construction not only of cathedrals of stone but also of the more enduring cathedrals of the mind.²⁵

The image of “cathedrals of the mind” is important. Speculative theology is not “mere speculation”; it is concerned with the most real reality there is, God. Intelligence, as Lonergan was to show in *Verbum*, is a created participation in the sacred for Aquinas.²⁶ What is more, systematic theology is not a scientific reflection upon faith or religious experience. As Lonergan stated clearly in his 1954 article on “Theology and Understanding,”

for St. Thomas theology is neither the understanding of faith nor the science of faith, neither . . . *Glaubensverständnis* nor . . . *Glaubenswissenschaft*. The subject of Thomist theology is not a set of propositions; it is not even a set of truths; it is a reality. *Deus est subiectum huius scientiae*. (*Summa*, I, 1, 7c)²⁷

The reality of God is the subject of theology, not human faith or human ideas or even human truths about God. Speculative theology in Aquinas’ and Lonergan’s sense, therefore, is not simply “speculation” in the modern idealist meaning of that term or that activity. One must seek as full a flowering of intelligence as

possible in systematic theology in order to attain, in the interaction of the light of reason and the light of faith, the Infinite Intelligence and Love who is God.

In his *Introduction*, the young Lonergan defined the elements in speculative theology and then showed all too briefly how the elements were correlated in phases of development. The four elements are theorems, terms, the dialectical position, and technique. "Theorem" is "defined as the difference between a common notion and a scientific concept." This difference he would spell out in *Insight* as that between common sense description and explanation.²⁸

So "acceleration," with the underlying differential calculus, is an explanatory or scientific elaboration of the common sense notions of "going faster" or "going more slowly." In theology there is the difficulty that the same term "supernatural" is often used in both senses. Thus Albert the Great and Aquinas use "supernatural" as a "theorem," as an explanatory or technical term with an exact philosophic definition. Analogous to the notion of acceleration depending on the development of differential calculus, the theorem of the supernatural depends upon theoretical advances regarding nature, habits, operations, causation, freedom, and divine transcendence. These theoretical advances came together in the work of Aquinas.

Theological theorems, then, involve the development of technical terms as analysis gives old words new meanings or comes up with new words. The young Lonergan was very much aware of the problems this posed for historians. It was a problem that they were not meeting too well, for

it is less clear that historians have attended sufficiently to a similar problem of their own [regarding the distinction between the language of dogmatic sources and the language of speculative theology]; not only must they distinguish between the language of the sources and the scientific language of their own day; they must also take into account the scientific language of the period they are treating.²⁹

In the light of Lonergan's later distinction in critical history between a first phase that understands the sources and a second phase that understands the realities analyzed in the sources, it would be important to realize that *Grace and Freedom* and *Verbum* were Lonergan's contributions towards moving critical historical scholarship on Aquinas from the first to the second phase.³⁰ What is at stake is a move from texts to the theoretical or speculative understanding of the realities referred to in the texts.

The young Lonergan defines speculative technique as primarily a philosophy capable of envisaging all fields of relevant data, of accurately analyzing nature — for “nature is a theophany” — and of ordering systematically the many questions of theology.³¹ What is here termed “speculative technique” is identified with the philosophy that is an *ancilla theologiae* or *philosophia perennis*. In the epilogue of *Insight*, Lonergan wrote of the work of the speculative theologian seeking universal formulations of the truths of faith, mentioning in this connection “the advantage of *philosophia perennis* and its expansion into speculative theology.”³²

The shift that occurred in *Method in Theology* was the realization that transcendental method and functional specialization expands the notion of theology enormously, integrating everything from biblical archeology and textual criticism through exegesis and critical history, with dialectics and foundations sorting out the massive differences concretely operative in the history of Christianity and theology.³³ At the same time, one can see in his treatment of the function specialty, systematics, the transposed concern for “speculative technique” as philosophy. This is precisely why the later Lonergan decried the separation of a philosophy of God and systematic theology that occurred from the seventeenth century onwards, and why he speaks of the function of a critical metaphysics in systematic theology.³⁴ A key in this transposition from the theoretical to the methodical is how intelligence is a created participation in Divine Intelligence, and how this can be formulated in terms of a metaphysics, as well as expressed in an intentionality analysis that moves from speaking of the “lumen intellectus agentis” to a pure and unrestricted desire to know.³⁵

Then there is what the young Lonergan calls the “dialectical position” in the *Introduction*. The “dialectical position” for

theology is the simultaneous affirmation that (1) the truths of faith and reason cannot be contradictory, so it is always possible to arrive at a negative coherence of non-contradiction; and (2) as humans we can never attain full explanatory knowledge of all doctrines, since "ultimately theology deals with mystery, with God in his transcendence."³⁶ This is taken up in the later Lonergan as "the orientation to transcendent mystery," which is basic to systematic theology and provides the "primary and fundamental meaning of the name, God." The orientation toward the Mystery who is God also "can be the bond uniting all despite cultural differences."³⁷ The early Lonergan saw the interplay in the development of theorems, terms, and philosophical techniques bringing theology before the real "essence of mystery":

Theological speculation never explains mysteries, but it does advance *from an initial position*, in which the mystery is not distinguished from adjacent merely philosophic problems . . . *towards a final position* in which the pure element of mystery stands in isolation from all else.³⁸

The role of speculative theology, of the "system" in systematic theology, is to promote that imperfect yet fruitful understanding of the mysteries that will clearly differentiate the mysteries of faith from the "human problems and the human elements in religious problems" which initially are undifferentiated from the genuine mystery of the living God revealed in the doctrines of faith.³⁹ The task of a genuine theology is to realize how theology's subject is nothing less than the reality of the mysterious God.

The task of a systematic theology dealing with grace and freedom, then, is first of all to understand human freedom and the natural universe sufficiently to be able to differentiate these from the creative and redemptive action of God. Hence, for the young Lonergan, several things were required: a theorem of the supernatural to differentiate the natural and supernatural; a theorem of human freedom that would differentiate free acts from determined or merely random events; an analogy of operation that would clarify how all finite operation is within a gifted orientation to

being and goodness; and a theorem of divine transcendence that would differentiate the reality of God's absolute transcendence from the misunderstandings resulting from human projections about that transcendence. Lonergan shows how our acts of understanding are not intrinsically conditioned by space and time. This provides an analogue for understanding the theorem of divine transcendence as an eternity unique to God. An understanding of divine eternity is intrinsic to the theorem of divine transcendence.

The Mind and the Eternal

“*Agere sequitur esse*”: acting follows being. As God is the only being whose essence is existence, so God is the only Good whose essence is act, just as God is the only Truth whose essence is understanding. The theorem of divine transcendence intrinsically involves God as eternal presence. In order to appreciate divine transcendence in all of its pure mystery, it was important for Lonergan to explore the human analogues, just as Augustine and Aquinas had. In *Grace and Freedom* and *Verbum*, it is fascinating to watch Lonergan explore the psychological orientations of the developments from Scripture and Augustine up to and including Aquinas. What Aquinas offered was the metaphysical analysis so important for speculative theology. Once they are integrated within his own intentionality analysis, the later Lonergan in *Method in Theology* will call for a return to psychology, no longer as with the medieval faculty psychology, but in terms of generalized empirical method.⁴⁰

Indeed, I would argue that Lonergan could pin down so accurately the theorem of divine transcendence and divine eternity because he was so steeped in the classics and Augustine before devoting the eleven years he spent reaching up to the mind of Aquinas. So, in the *Introduction* to his doctoral dissertation, he wrote:

Philosophy as *philosophia perennis* is man's apprehension of the eternal and immutable. Like all limited being, it is potentiality and achievement, *dunamis* and *energeia*, potency and act. Its

potency is the love of wisdom: it is detachment, orientation, inspiration. Its act is the triumph of the reason systematically revealing the light of the eternal in the light of common day. For all time the potency is represented by Plato, the act by Aristotle.⁴¹

“Systematically revealing the light of the eternal in the light of common day”: this insight would wait until *Verbum* to find its fuller explication. In order to appreciate the pure mystery of grace, however, it is important that we not misunderstand as mystery what is only a problem insofar as we have not understood our own created natures.

I would call your attention to those passages in *Verbum* where Lonergan so clearly lays out how our own conscious intentionality transcends space and time. It would be a mistake to read Lonergan as dismissing Augustine: quite the contrary, as his introduction to the book edition of *Verbum* makes clear. Entitled “Subject and Soul,” it introduces how Aquinas unites Augustine and Aristotle. Lonergan’s admiration for Augustine is seen in his characterization of him as “a subject that may be studied but, most of all, must be encountered in the outpouring of his self-revelation and self-communication.”⁴²

Augustine minded his own mind and heart. His *Confessions* narrate how intensely Augustine’s own consciousness or “presence” was an ongoing conversation and communion with the Divine Presence more intimate to all of us than we are to ourselves. After the first book praising God as origin and end of creation mirrored in his own infancy, books two to four deal with Augustine’s recollections of his descent into disordered living. Books five to nine begin the process of re-orienting his life back into God, culminating in the transcendent wisdom experience with Monica at Ostia. The graced transcendent event is concretely immanent. It occurs in a particular place and time, and transcends it into God in such a way that, unlike Platonists or Plotinus, the advent of the eternal God is incarnated in concrete histories. The Eternal does not negate time but creates it and, in covenant and Incarnation, embraces all the concrete events of time. Augustine observes how

God is more intimate to him than he is to himself, but that while God is always present to him, he was often absent from his own mind and heart as he pursued disordered desires.⁴³

Conversion is needed, a turning toward the inner light of our minds and hearts as created by eternal light. This process of re-orientation or conversion back to God, by God's own grace, is threefold. Although it is only approximate, books five through seven predominantly narrate the *intellectual* dimensions of Augustine's conversion. In book eight, the *moral* aspects of his struggle are narrated, culminating in the grace while reading Romans 13:13. Book nine then concentrates upon the central *religious* nature of his conversion. This threefold conversion process is fundamental to all of Augustine's theology.⁴⁴ A reader can adequately understand neither his *Confessions* nor his *On the Trinity* without undergoing such a conversion process.

This is especially so if we seek to attain some fruitful, if imperfect, understanding of divine transcendence or divine eternity. In *Verbum*, Lonergan indicates how our conscious intentionality, as a created participation in divine consciousness, transcends space and time. The texts are almost all in the chapter on reflection and judgment. Similar to Augustine's affirmation of the utterly transcendent God embracing all the concrete particularities of creation, Lonergan finds in Aquinas' analysis of knowing an eternal presence that enfolds the concrete (recall the eternal light in the light of the common day):

Knowledge of the *quod quid est* takes us outside space and time; but the act of *compositio vel divisio* involves a return to the concrete. In particular, whatever may be hymned about eternal truths, human judgments always involve a specification of time.⁴⁵

The very acute psychological attentiveness of Aquinas leads Lonergan to realize that what Thomas has done is wed Aristotle's knowledge by identity with Augustine's understanding of illumination. For "since reflection is not an identity, the Aristotelian theory of knowledge by identity is incomplete," with the result

that Aquinas validates rational reflection with a transformation of the Augustinian vision of eternal truth:

Our knowledge of truth is not to be accounted for by any vision or contact or confrontation with the other, however lofty or sublime. The ultimate ground of our knowing is indeed God, the eternal Light; but the reason why we know is within us. It is the light of our own intellects; and by it we can know because "the very intellectual light which is within us is nothing other than a certain created participation of the eternal light. (*Summa Theologiae*, I, 84, 5c)⁴⁶

The light of our intelligence derives its efficacy from the "*Prima Lux*," which is God. All the certitude we possess comes from the intellectual light within us, so that questioning and knowing is a divine-human cooperation in teaching.⁴⁷ For Aquinas, teaching is a sacred activity. Intelligence is profoundly holy, for

inasmuch as the act of understanding grasps its own transcendence-in-immanence, its quality of intellectual light as a participation of the divine and uncreated Light, it expresses itself in judgment, in a positing of the truth, in the affirmation or negation of reality.⁴⁸

To make a judgment is to participate in, to confess, the creative reality of God. The critical problem is to be met by attention to intellectual light, whereby we get "beyond mere relativity to immutable truth" and distinguish appearance from reality.⁴⁹ So "normative self-knowledge" requires attention to the soul as participating in eternal light:

There is to intellectual light an inner *nisus* towards the infinite. Aristotle opened his *Metaphysics* with the remark that naturally all men desire to know. But Aquinas measured that desire

to find in the undying restlessness and absolute exigence of the human mind that intellect as intellect is infinite, that *ipsum esse* is *ipsum intelligere* and uncreated, unlimited Light, that though our intellects because potential cannot attain naturally to the vision of God, still our intellects as intellects have a dynamic orientation, a natural desire, that nothing short of that unknown vision can satisfy utterly.⁵⁰

As Augustine saw how our hearts are restless until they rest in God, so Aquinas realized that our minds are restless until they are one with Infinite Understanding, generating Infinite Truth, spirating Infinite Love.

In terms of a theological understanding of God as Eternal Mystery, the achievements of Augustine, Boethius and Aquinas have not been equaled in subsequent centuries. Why was it so difficult for successors to carry this forward? Perhaps the analysis of intelligibility in terms of motion (e.g., *Summa Theologiae*, I, 2, 3c) was open to misunderstandings. One's attention could be so engrossed in the object moving or changing that one would not attend to one's own intelligence analyzing the motion. This, in over-simplified brevity, is what occurred with Scotus and an entire line of commentators from the fourteenth through the seventeenth centuries (indeed, down to our own time). The components of being (potency, form, act) became entities; the explanatory breakthrough of Aquinas was lost as metaphysics became ever more mechanical, objectivist, logically deductivist.

Thus, one hundred years before Galileo, decadent schoolmen were arguing at Padua that since *forma* is fundamentally "shape," it would be far better to transpose analysis of forms into an analysis of forces; the whole of reality is made up of force and counter-force. Extension and duration were seen as constitutive of objective reality.⁵¹

Not attending to intelligence in act, the stage was set for rather massive misunderstandings of just what humans were doing when intelligence-in-act really took off with the methods of the empirical sciences in the seventeenth century. What happened was,

therefore, a compound of brilliant scientific praxis with disastrously misdirected cover stories when scientists tried their hand at philosophy. The cover stories took on see-saw variations of empiricism and idealism, and these became part and parcel of the emerging Enlightenment cultures. Empiricism and idealism marked the decline into a host of conflicting dualisms as correlates of the Cartesian *res extensa* and *res cogitans*: body-soul, matter-spirit, object-subject, male-female, action-passion, and so on.

In Descartes and Spinoza, as well as in Newton's theological works, one can see how the notion of eternity in Augustine and Aquinas is completely lost. Eternity is infinite extension and duration with mind (*Deus sive natura*), or without mind and in need of human minds to impose order upon the chaos of matter-in-motion. The naive realism of the above view was substituted for a critical idealism in Kant and Fichte. On 20 August 1770, Kant defended his thesis, *De Mundo sensibilis atque intelligibilis forma et principii*, in which he laid out "the concept of time" as the one and immutable duration — what he would later term "duratio nominalis" — as Eternity which causes all phenomenal things. Phenomenal time as we know it is negated, but what such a noumenal duration is we cannot know.⁵²

Hegel, as an absolute idealist, would take the next step and seek to identify the divine eternity with Concept as Absolute Knowledge. Extension and duration are intelligible only if they are manifestations of *Geist*. The idealism of "pure reason" is no longer checked by sense-data; rather the latter are deduced in the Science of Logic from Concept. Reason as Absolute Spirit was also Infinite Power, so the "Thinking Power" of Absolute Spirit unfolds in history with the *List der Vernunft*, the cunning of Reason. As the German-Jewish intellectuals of the Frankfurt School pointed out, especially Adorno and Horkheimer in *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, pure reason can transmogrify into pure terror.⁵³

Divine Transcendence and Eternity

Such a *Weltgeist* is far from the reality of the Eternal God, who, as Aquinas mentions in *De Malo* (6, 1 ad 3), governs and orders everything according to its own inner nature, so that

contingent beings are moved contingently and free beings moved freely. God as Infinite Understanding generating Infinite Truth and spirating Infinite Love is *toto coelo* different from the monster of an Hegelian *Weltgeist*.

There was a progressive clarification and differentiation in the respective works of Augustine, Boethius, and Aquinas, and, as Lonergan mentions in *Grace and Freedom*, the best way of understanding Augustine is to attend to the subsequent speculative development.⁵⁴ From the achievement of Aquinas, it might be stated that eternity is God. The eternal God is an infinitely simple Understanding, Knowing, Loving in whom there is not the slightest trace of extension or duration. God's creative act eternally embraces the totality of all created beings, including the totality of material creation with all its extensions and durations. Divine eternity does not negate time. On the contrary, divine eternity as the Triune God creates all time. The whole of cosmic space and time, the whole of human history in all its concrete contingencies, are totally and simultaneously present in the Divine Presence.

Thus to call God eternal and to call the universe eternal is to use the word "eternal" equivocally. God's eternity is a "*Totum Esse Praesens*" (Augustine) or "*Vitae tota simul et perfecta Possessio*" (Boethius), which can be said neither of any creature nor of the created universe as a whole. The "eternity of the world" debate deals with whether there is any beginning or end to all created durations, just as the infinity of the universe is a debate on whether there are any limits to created extensions. God's eternity embraces the totality of all extensions and durations, the totality of creation.⁵⁵

God as eternal is Infinite Being as Unrestricted Understanding, Infinite Truth, Unconditional Love. Reality is not, therefore, constituted by extension and duration *per se*. Understanding, knowing, loving are just as real, and indeed higher realities, than all the "vast" extensions and durations of our material universe. Inter-subjective and interpersonal friendships are higher than atoms, molecules, mountains. There is not any "competition" between the material universe and the more intense reality of understanding, knowing, loving. Atoms and molecules, bones and mountains, deer and cats and mice and dogs, along with each and

every human being and each and every event in their lives, are all eternally present in God's creative understanding, knowing, loving. There is no "before" or "after" in the Divine Presence. The entire existing universe, with all of the conditioned, contingent, and free events and acts within it, is created and present because of the completely free and gifted divine act of creation.

Far from impinging upon human freedom, God's eternal presence creating the universe makes human freedom possible and actual. For God's infinitely free creative act makes actual what human finite freedom requires: namely, a universe in which there are many different courses of action objectively possible, minds capable of understanding such different courses and not determining the will to choose any one particular course of action, and finally human beings with wills capable of self-determination.⁵⁶

Reflect on any free choice and action you have made. It would not have been possible if you did not exist; if there were not at least one other alternative you could have chosen. You chose to do it because it at least appeared as a good for you to so choose and act. Human freedom is not a neutrality before good and evil. Created, human freedom by its own deepest and most genuine desire wishes the good. So from Augustine to Aquinas there are ever more differentiated explorations of the distinction between ordered and disordered desire. Ordered desire is desire flowering in the good, attuned to the created and redeemed universe, because the desire is immanently oriented to its own divine creative source in God. Disordered desires choose finite goods by removing them from their inner order to the good of creation established by God. So every evil choice does violence to the harmony of creation. As Aquinas put it: because the human will is oriented into the universal good, this orientation or tendency cannot be the effect of any particular cause, but only of the universal cause, God.⁵⁷

In *Grace and Freedom*, Lonergan was content with setting out how God alone has the property of transcendence, so that the divine "now" or presence is completely transcendent to succession, to duration. So he indicated how St. Thomas "strenuously and consistently" maintained that our universe of time as past, present, and future is totally present in the "now" of God's understanding.⁵⁸

So, for the truth of any statement that God willed such and such to happen, it is required that such and such really happen.⁵⁹ In God is present each and every event in the whole of the created universe. The whole of creation is fully intelligible to God. Within all of this wonderful and mysterious universe, human beings abused their freedom and sinned. Insofar as the evil of sin (*malum culpae*) is defined as “willful withdrawal from the orientation of divine understanding” (*subducere se ab ordinatione divini intellectus*), it is an “absolute objective falsity.” The unintelligibility of history, the irrationality of history, is true insofar as history is under the shadows of sin. Augustine had poignantly described the impotence of the intellectual and moral virtues to deal with the sinful evils of human history. Left to our own devices, practical wisdom and justice are quite simply overwhelmed.⁶⁰ Thus it was only thanks to the theological virtues — faith, hope, and agapic love — that intelligibility and goodness are again gifted to human history.

Aquinas provided the intellectual framework for grasping how we cannot understand the irrationality of sin. Anything is understandable to the degree that it is commensurable with the divine understanding. God is not a problem. Nor does God need any explanation. God is infinite understanding, infinite intelligence. God is the explanation of everything else. When we human beings sin against the light and love of the universe, when we commit the evil of sin, then we commit an absolute objective falsity. As Lonergan comments:

We can know sin as a fact; we cannot place it in intelligible correlation with other things except *per accidens*; that is, one sin can be correlated with another, for deficient antecedents have defective consequents; but the metaphysical surd of sin cannot be related explanatorily or causally with the integers that are objective truth; for sin is really irrational, a departure at once from the ordinance of the divine mind and from the dictate of right reason. The rational and the irrational cannot mix, except in fallacious speculation. And

this precept is not merely relative to man; it is absolute. The mysteries of faith are mysteries only to us because of their excess of intelligibility; but the *mysterium iniquitatis* is mysterious in itself and objectively, because of a defect of intelligibility.⁶¹

The evil of sin could only be overcome by the graced new creation of God's covenant with Israel and the incarnation of the Word in Jesus Christ. There is no intelligibility of history which is not gifted. Insofar as humankind broke the intelligibility of creation in human history, it could only be newly created by God. And, as Lonergan was later to elaborate in his *De Verbo Incarnato*, God chose to overcome the evil of sin by suffering it. The intrinsic intelligibility of the redemption of history is the law of the cross.⁶²

At the conclusion of chapter five of *Grace and Freedom*, Lonergan succinctly indicates how divine eternity is intrinsic to the theorem of divine transcendence. It is a powerfully beautiful passage in its metaphysical austerity. It begins with God alone and ends with the sinner alone. These two very different "alones" find analogues in the difference between the monk and the monad. The monk is in the divine solitude whose presence embraces the totality of redeemed creation. The monad is in the egophanic solitude peering out suspiciously at a hostile and terrifyingly irrational chaos:

God alone has the property of transcendence. It is only in the logico-metaphysical simultaneity of the atemporal present that God's knowledge is infallible, His will irresistible, His action efficacious. He exercises control through the created antecedents — true enough; but that is not the infallible, the irresistible, the efficacious, which has its ground not in the creature but in the uncreated, which has its moment not in time but in the cooperation of eternal uncreated action with created temporal action. Again, the ante-

cedents *per se* always incline to the right and good. But the consequent act may be good or it may be sinful: if it is good, all the credit is God's, and the creature is only His instrument; but if it is evil, then inasmuch as it is sin as such, it is a surd (preceded, indeed, by a divine permission which is infallible without being a cause or a non-cause), and so in the causal order a first for which the sinner alone is responsible.⁶³

More profoundly, I believe that here Lonergan has recovered the context in which Augustine and Aquinas spoke of original sin. Augustine articulated this doctrine in order to understand how God as creator is not the cause of evil and sin in human history. The Greeks tended to understand human being as a *metaxy* or an "in-between" the gods and beasts. The difficulty with this is that it would then tend to ascribe the disorientation of sin either to the gods or to beasts. Augustine mocked this mythology as unworthy of reason. The real *metaxy* of human being is not between gods and beasts, but between the creating and redeeming God and the originating disorientation of human beings refusing the gift of the creator God.⁶⁴ Human nature is naturally oriented to the good; evil and sin are caused by the refusal of humans to choose the truly good: This is then transposed by Aquinas. All human beings are one in nature, so the narrative of the fall is revelatory of the loss of original justice. Just as the graced original orientation toward God would have been gifted with nature, so now the original disorientation corrupts our human being in the world.⁶⁵

What does Lonergan mean when he writes about God's efficacious control having its moment "not in time but in the cooperation of eternal uncreated action with created and temporal action"? When we cooperate with God, do we somehow participate in God's transcendence of time? Created and temporal action is completely dependent upon God's eternal uncreated action. All created and temporal actions are dependently related (i.e., caused) by God's eternal uncreated action. How is it that human beings are instruments of God, not instruments of grace?⁶⁶ Human beings can only be instruments of God. No created cause

is adequate to moving human beings instrumentally as God can and does. For, as Aquinas in *De Malo* makes clear, only God can move free creatures freely (6, 1).

In *Grace and Freedom*, Lonergan answers the last question by pointing out how, for Aquinas, the universal instrumentality of fate is not only passive in human beings. We participate in the divine governance of the universe, not only by being governed, but also by governing. This, then, leads to the differentiation of operative and cooperative grace. Lonergan found in our natural knowledge of God the proper analogy for understanding divine transcendence and human freedom. Redemption is redemption of creation. It is also far more. For why is grace *grace*? Because it is absolutely supernatural; that is, there is only one nature to which it is proportionate, and that is the divine nature. In Christ we are called to live and act in ways natural to God. We are called into a friendship: with the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit; with the communion of saints in the beatitude of eternal life. Theology, for Aquinas, seeks a theoretical knowledge whose principles are subaltern to the knowledge of the blessed in heaven. This indicates why *Deus est subjectum huius scientiae* — God is the subject of theology.

Conclusion

This essay begins to answer Fr. McCool's question from the perspective of Lonergan's first sustained study of Aquinas. A philosophy of the human mind, not segregated from but enlightened by theology, can preserve both the meaning and the truth of the mysteries of the Christian faith. The ascent to theoretical or speculative understanding of the truths of faith does not in any way negate all the concreteness of history. What is required is attention to intellectual conversion, so that an approach to history does not collapse into an historicism that negates truly intelligent understanding. Nor is this intellectual conversion isolated from the moral turning toward the good and a religious conversion to the sacred and all-loving Triune God.

In a later work, Lonergan indicates how an intellectualist understanding of divine transcendence, grounded in the theologies

of St. Augustine and St. Thomas Aquinas, affords a proper understanding of the acts of knowing and loving as participating in divine knowledge and love. This is not a Cartesian or Kantian transcendentalism that sets personal presence over against the intersubjective presence of interpersonal communication. What is at stake in theology is a proper understanding of the Eternal Triune God and the genuine proclamation of the Word of God calling us to eternal friendship and communion.

I shall conclude this tribute to Fr. McCool with a long passage from Lonergan's *De Deo Trino* that takes up a perspective which Fr. McCool shares with his friend and colleague, Fr. Norris Clarke.⁶⁷ What is at stake is that fruitful but imperfect understanding of the mutual indwelling presence of the Triune God creating and redeeming the whole of reality, including the whole of human history:

The Divine Persons, the blessed in heaven, and the justified here on earth are mutually present in each other as the known is present in the knower and as the beloved is present in the lover. Attention is to be given to this knowing and loving both with respect to its ultimate goal which is that good which is the good through its essence and with respect to its proximate goal which is a common good of order, the kingdom of God, the Body of Christ, the Church. Moreover, the consequent mutual indwelling differs in accord with the nature and state of each individual: for the Divine Persons are mutually present in each other on the basis of consubstantiality; the justified are present in God and in each other on the basis of intentional act of existence and on the basis of the kind of identification proper to love; we are in the Word as known to him and beloved by him both on the basis of his divine Nature and on the basis of his human nature; the Word is in us in our knowledge and love for him as a sensible man as we

are reaching toward a knowledge and love of God who dwells in inaccessible light (1 Tim. 6:16). And because the prior knowledge and love is easier for us in that it includes our sensitive memory of the past and our imagination of the future, we are led by it to that higher knowledge and love in which we now no longer know Christ in the flesh but our own inner word proper to the divine Word is spoken intelligibly in us on the basis of an emanation of truth and our own love proper to the divine Love is spirated on the basis of an emanation of sanctity. For the Divine Persons are sent on the basis of their eternal processions so that they may meet us and dwell in us on the basis of similar processions that are produced in us through grace. But those who proceed from and are sent by the Father do not come without the Father to whom all glory belongs through the Son and the Spirit.⁶⁸

Notes

1. Gerald A. McCool, *From Unity to Pluralism: The Internal Evolution of Thomism* (New York: Fordham University Press, 1989), 230.

2. Bernard Lonergan, *Insight: A Study of Human Understanding* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992):

To penetrate to the mind of a medieval thinker is to go beyond his words and phrases. It is to effect an advance in depth that is proportionate to the broadening influence of historical research. It is to grasp questions as once they were grasped. It is to take the *opera omnia* of such a writer as St. Thomas Aquinas and to follow through successive works the variations and developments of his views. It is to study the concomitance of such variations and developments and to arrive at a grasp of their motives and causes. It is to discover for oneself that the intellect of Aquinas, more rapidly on some points, more slowly on others,

reached a position of dynamic equilibrium without ever ceasing to drive towards fuller and more nuanced synthesis, without ever halting complacently in some finished mental edifice, as though his mind had become dull, or his brain exhausted, or his judgment had lapsed into the error of those that forget man to be potency in the realm of intelligence. (769)

3. Lonergan, *Insight*, 765-70. Note the final sentence of *Insight*: “that one can hope to reach the mind of Aquinas, and once that mind is reached, then it is difficult not to import his compelling genius to the problems of this later day” (770). For an historical precedent of the relation between pluralism and unity of teaching, see Gerald A. McCool, *From Unity to Pluralism*, 210-21; and his *The Neo-Thomists* (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1994), 157-61. For another perspective, see Romanus Cessario, “An Observation on Robert Lauder’s Review of G.A. McCool, S.J.,” in *The Thomist* 56, no. 4 (1992): 701-10.

4. McCool, *The Neo-Thomists*, 137-66.

5. Philip Gleason, *Contending with Modernity: Catholic Higher Education in the Twentieth Century* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 105-23.

6. McCool, *From Unity to Pluralism*, 34-35.

7. McCool, *The Neo-Thomists*, 160.

8. Bernard Lonergan, *A Second Collection* (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1974):

I was sent to Rome for theology, and there I was subject to two important influences. One was from an Athenian, Stefanos Stefanu, who had entered the Jesuit Sicilian province and had been sent to Louvain to study philosophy at a time when Maréchal taught psychology to the Jesuit students and the other professors at the scholasticate taught Maréchal. Stefanu and I used to prepare our exams together. Our aim was clarity and rigor — an aim all the more easily obtained, the less the theses really meant. It was through Stefanu by some process of osmosis, rather than through struggling with the five great *Cahiers*, that I learnt to speak of human knowledge as not intuitive but discursive with the decisive component in judgment. This view was confirmed by my familiarity with Augustine’s key notion, *veritas*, and the whole was rounded out by Bernard Leeming’s course on the Incarnate Word, which convinced me that there could

not be a hypostatic union without a real distinction between essence and existence. This, of course, was all the more acceptable, since Aquinas' *esse* corresponded to Augustine's *veritas* and both harmonized with Maréchal's view of judgment. (265)

9. Bernard Lonergan, *Grace and Freedom: Operative Grace in the Thought of St. Thomas Aquinas*, ed. J. Patout Burns (New York: Herder and Herder, 1971).

10. See J. Michael Stebbins, *The Divine Initiative: Grace, World-Order, and Human Freedom in the Early Writings of Bernard Lonergan* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1995).

11. These three conversions are especially clear in St. Augustine's *Confessions*, Books V-IX; also Ernest Fortin's several essays on Augustine in J. Brian Benestad, ed., *The Birth of Philosophic Christianity* (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 1996), 1-120. On the movement toward theory, see Lonergan's "The Origins of Christian Realism," in *A Second Collection*, 239-61. The foundational reality of intellectual, moral, and religious conversion is treated in Lonergan's *Method in Theology* (New York: Herder and Herder, 1972), 267-94.

12. See Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, I-II, 55-67; II-II, 1-170.

13. This conversion had to be made explicit, otherwise the achievements of theology from Augustine to Aquinas would continue to be misunderstood, as in decadent scholasticism and nominalism. In order to retrieve Aquinas' cognitional theory from the deformations into which it had fallen at the hands of too many so-called Thomists, Lonergan wrote *Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997). This work sets out the basic terms and relations operative, not only in the cognitional theory of Aquinas, but also how those terms and relations are derived from the human experiences of questioning, understanding, and judging. Insight into images generates understanding, and this understanding expresses itself in concepts. But human understanding is not content with mere thinking; we want to know what is really true, so questions of truth emerge, and only when we grasp the sufficiency of the evidence do we reach judgment and truth or falsity. In detailed analysis of the texts of Aquinas, as well as attention to our own human acts of understanding, Lonergan shows that what Aquinas terms "the light of active intellect as a created participation in divine light" is in fact our human capacity to raise ever further questions. The human mind is infinite in potency — there is no end to the questions we raise, every answer evokes more questions — while the divine mind is infinite actuality. Just as Augustine saw that our hearts are

restless until they rest in God, so for Aquinas our minds are restless until they rest in God. Only through an experiential appropriation of human cognitional operations can one understand how Aquinas' cognitional theory flowers into his systematic presentation of Augustine's psychological analogy of the Trinity.

14. Lonergan, *Method in Theology*, 352.

15. For example, in the preface of Peter Brown's oft-cited biography of Augustine, Brown admits that he has not scaled the heights of Augustine's *De Trinitate*. This becomes evident when he fails to understand the profound struggles Augustine had with intellectual conversion, as narrated in the *Confessions*, interpreting these as a change from a "literary career" to one in philosophy. Brown puts Augustine's own designation of this as a conversion in quotes, remarking that in its final form this career change was "most idiosyncratic" (*Augustine of Hippo* [Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975], 101ff). Little wonder, then, that Elaine Pagels, who relied so heavily on Brown's presentation of Augustine, would further distort Augustine's achievements in her *Adam, Eve, and the Serpent* (New York: Random House, 1988), 98-154. We now have graduate students and theologians writing on Pagels, so we are at the stage of popularization of a common sense popularization (Pagels) of a common sense popularization (Brown). This is but one small example of how theology is impoverished today.

16. Lonergan, *Grace and Freedom*, 93-116.

17. Bernard Lonergan, "The *Gratia Operans* Dissertation: Preface and Introduction," ed. with an introduction by F.E. Crowe, S.J., in *Method: Journal of Lonergan Studies* 3, no. 2 (1985): 1-49. All subsequent references to the introduction to this dissertation will be cited as *Introduction*.

18. Lonergan, *Introduction*, 10.

19. Lonergan, *Introduction*, 12.

20. Lonergan, *Introduction*, 15.

21. Lonergan, *Introduction*, 11f.

22. Lonergan, *Introduction*, 15.

23. Lonergan, *Introduction*, 16.

24. Later Lonergan came up with "patterns of experience" to articulate the issues at stake; see *Insight*, 204-14; *Method in Theology*, 29, 220-34, 286. On the problematic of historicism and science, see Matthew L. Lamb, "The Dialectic of Theory and Praxis in Paradigm Analysis," in Hans Küng and David Tracy, eds., *Changing Paradigms in Theology* (New York: Crossroads, 1989), 63-109.

25. Lonergan, *Introduction*, 18. In this work, "speculative theology" refers to this "system" in systematic theology. After the *Verbum* studies,

in which Lonergan laid out the range of intellect in Aquinas, he could pin down the disasters awaiting theology when the understanding at the heart of speculative theology is not fostered. The dilemma facing conceptualism is clear:

It is only inasmuch as different concepts proceed from one act of understanding that different concepts are seen to be joined by a necessary nexus. Remove the effort to understand and understanding will decrease; as understanding decreases, fewer concepts are seen to be joined by a necessary nexus; and as this seeing decreases, certitudes decrease. To stop the process, either one must restore the effort to understand or one must appeal not to intellect but to some higher or lower power. (*Verbum*, 211)

Thus the tendencies in Catholicism towards a fideist authoritarianism on the part of some (higher powers), or to rather unmindful appeals to now this and now that experience (lower powers).

26. Lonergan, *Verbum*, 78-105, 192-99.

27. Lonergan, *Collection*, ed. Frederick Crowe and Robert Doran, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988), 117.

28. Lonergan, *Introduction*, 19; *Grace and Freedom*, 13ff.; *Insight*, 316 ff. Note how Lonergan, while having dealt with explanatory concepts from the first chapter on in *Insight*, nevertheless articulated the distinctions between description and explanation for the first time at length in the section on common sense judgments. The point is that both "deal with the same things," and that is crucial for realizing the realities understood in explanation.

29. Lonergan, *Introduction*, 20.

30. Lonergan, *Method in Theology*, 189. On the inadequacy of much critical history in theology, see Matthew L. Lamb, "Historicity and Eternity: Bernard Lonergan's Transpositions and Differentiations," in Fred Lawrence, ed., *Lonergan Workshop*, vol. 10 (Boston: Boston College Lonergan Institute Press, 1994), 179-227.

31. Lonergan, *Introduction*, 21.

32. Lonergan, *Insight*, 763-68.

33. For a discussion of this by Lonergan, see his *Philosophy of God and Theology* (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1973), 33-35; also his response to Crowe and Gilkey in *Foundations of Theology*, ed. P. McShane (Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 1971), 223-25.

34. Lonergan, *Method in Theology*, 337, 343; *Philosophy of God and Theology*, 54ff.

35. See Lonergan, *Verbum*, 85-101; *Collection*, 202-03; *Insight*, 659-65.
36. Lonergan, *Introduction*, 20f.
37. Lonergan, *Method in Theology*, 341.
38. Lonergan, *Introduction*, 23.
39. Lonergan, *Introduction*, 25.
40. Compare Lonergan, *Grace and Freedom*, 13-19, 48-53; *Verbum* 10ff; *Method in Theology*, 343.
41. Lonergan, *Introduction*, 26.
42. Lonergan, *Verbum*, 3-11.
43. Augustine, *Confessions*: "my desire was before You, and the light of my eyes was not with me, for it was within, and I was outside" (VII, 7); and especially: "Too late have I loved You, O Beauty ever ancient ever new, too late have I loved You! For behold, You were within and I was outside. . . . You were with me, but I was not with You" (X, 27; my translations).
44. See Matthew L. Lamb, "Presence and Eternity in St. Augustine's *Confessions*," a paper given at the Boston Patristic Society (unpublished).
45. Lonergan, *Verbum*, 75. In *Insight*, this participation of human knowing in the eternal is stated as the mind and human central form as not intrinsically conditioned by space and time, which metaphysical affirmation is proved by reference to human knowing as attaining absolute objectivity (Lonergan's transposition of Augustine's *veritas* and Aquinas' judgment as knowing *esse*). See *Insight*, 359-71, 399-402, 538-44; also Matthew L. Lamb, "Ascent From Human Consciousness to the Human Soul," in *Insight: A Quarterly Review of Religion and Mental Health* 3/4 (1964): 18-28.
46. Lonergan, *Verbum*, 84-86.
47. Lonergan, *Verbum*, 92.
48. Lonergan, *Verbum*, 95.
49. Lonergan, *Verbum*, 95-96.
50. Lonergan, *Verbum*, 100.
51. See Amos Funkenstein, *Theology and the Scientific Imagination* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 80ff.
52. See Matthew L. Lamb, "Nature, History and Redemption," in William Loewe and Vernon Gregson, eds., *Jesus Crucified and Risen* (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 1998); Immanuel Kant, *De Mundo Sensibilis atque Intelligibilis Forma et Principii*, in *Werke*, V (Suhrkamp Verlag, 1958), 46-56, and *Das Ends Aller Dinge*, in *Werke*, XI (Suhrkamp Verlag, 1964), 175-88.
53. Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, *Dialectik der Aufklärung: Philosophische Fragmente* (Frankfurt: S. Fischer, 1969); Edith Wyschogrod,

Spirit in Ashes: Hegel, Heidegger, and Man-Made Mass Death. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985).

54. Lonergan, *Grace and Freedom*, 5.

55. See Augustine, *Confessions*, XI, 10-13. Boethius carried forward Augustine's breakthrough by providing philosophical precision, by indicating how a correct analogue sublates the positions of Plato and Aristotle. There is the immanence of the whole of the created universe in the absolute transcendence of God's knowing presence: *Consolations of Philosophy*:

Eternity is the whole, simultaneous and perfect possession of limitless life. . . . Since then every judgment comprehends those things subject to it according to its own nature, and God has an always eternal and present nature, then his knowledge too, surpassing all movement of time, is permanent in the simplicity of his present, and embracing all the infinite spaces of the future and the past, considers them in his simple act of knowledge as though they were now going on. So if you should wish to consider his foreknowledge, by which he discerns all things, you will more rightly judge it to be not foreknowledge as it were of the future but knowledge of a never-passing instant" (V, chapter 6; my translation).

See also Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, I, 9-10.

56. Lonergan, *Grace and Freedom*, 95-97. By "self-determination" I mean what Lonergan and Aquinas mean by "self-motion" of the will.

57. Lonergan, *Grace and Freedom*, 102. Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*: "God moves the human will as the universal mover to the universal object of the will, which is the good. And without this universal motion man cannot will anything" (I, 54, 2; I-II, 9, 6, ad 3).

58. Lonergan, *Grace and Freedom*, 103f.

59. Lonergan develops this as an analogy based upon the natural knowledge of God; see *De Constitutione Christi Ontologica et Psychologica* (Rome: Gregorian University Press, 1961), 57-82.

60. Augustine, *City of God*, Book XIX. This is another area which Peter Brown neglects. So it is not surprising that Elaine Pagels provides a naive caricature, as if Augustine had to "think up" original sin. Max Horkheimer was far more intelligent when he remarked how, of all the doctrines of Judaism and Christianity, original sin should be evident to any attentive mind contemplating the human abuse of freedom down the centuries; see his *Die Sehnsucht nach dem ganz Anderen: Ein Interview und Kommentar von Helmut Gumnior* (Hamburg: Furche Verlag, 1970).

61. Lonergan, *Grace and Freedom*, 113.
62. Bernard Lonergan, *De Verbo Incarnato* (Rome: Gregorian University Press, 1964), 552-93.
63. Lonergan, *Grace and Freedom*, 116.
64. See Augustine, *De Civitate Dei*, II, IX-XIII.
65. Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, I-II, 81, 1 and 2.
66. Lonergan, *Grace and Freedom*, 127
67. See Gerald McCool, ed., *The Universe as Journey: Conversations with W. Norris Clarke, S.J.* (New York: Fordham University Press, 1988).
68. Bernard Lonergan, *De Deo Trino* (Rome: Gregorian University Press, 1964), 2:255-56.