

CHAPTER EIGHT

Head and Heart in Rousselot and Lonergan

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Newman's Theorem and Faculty Psychology

Two themes dominate this essay. First, there is what Lonergan calls "Newman's Theorem," when he invokes "the basic theorem in Newman's *Idea of a University*" (1974, 141):

Positively, Newman advanced that human knowing was a whole with its parts organically related, and this accords with the contemporary phenomenological notion of horizon, that one's perceptions are functions of one's outlook, that one's meaning is a function of a context and that context of still broader contexts. On the negative side, Newman asked what would happen if a significant part of knowledge were omitted, overlooked, ignored, not just by some individual but by the cultural community, and he contended that there would be three consequences. First, people in general would be ignorant of that area. Second, the rounded whole of human knowing would be mutilated. Third, the remaining parts would endeavor to round off the whole once more despite the omission of a part and, as a result, they would suffer distortion from their

effort to perform a function for which they were not designed. Such was Newman's theorem. (142)

Neglect of affection, the missing third of the triad of consciousness, is an instance of Newman's Theorem and is my first theme.

The second theme is *connaturality* as a phenomenological principle applicable to all of human consciousness, beyond cognition, and thus as a mode of operation of consciousness in all its intentionalities: affection, cognition, and volition. In all three intentionalities, ideal human action — that is, action *per modum naturae* taken as the paradigm for the high end of developed human acting — flows much more directly from one's whole self (or being or nature) than from any single intentionality. Each intentionality forms part of consciousness. The division of labor among the kinds of consciousness is a substitute (as Rousselot would put it) for a better, more unitary mode of operation.

Connaturality was important for Rousselot, but his interpreters have not emphasized it enough, Martin D'Arcy being an exception. For Rousselot, connaturality names the way we act as persons, as subjects who by becoming the equal of our natures can thereby act through our natures as through ourselves, not merely as collections of faculties. Rousselot better than anyone before Lonergan transcended faculty psychology, even while usually (not always) expressing himself in its terms. He transcended faculty psychology by placing intellect (and will, and so on) into a hierarchy of spirits in which discursive reason and deliberative will were recognized as substitutes for (or analogously conceived participations in) the simpler, intuitive, spontaneous operations of higher spirits. In this essay, I will approach Rousselot and Lonergan from the vantage points of these two themes.¹

In *Head and Heart*, I drew primarily upon two contemporary traditions, the phenomenological and the neo-Thomist. Specifically, I depended on recent continental thought since Husserl for the former tradition and, for the latter, on twentieth-century transcendental Thomism, represented mainly by Pierre Rousselot, Joseph Maréchal, Karl Rahner, and Bernard Lonergan, but also on Dietrich von Hildebrand, a philosopher known more for his

allegiance to Augustine than to Aquinas. This essay updates the analyses of that book, analyses which were, not surprisingly, given the timing of most academic book publishing, already dated by a couple of years at the time they saw light. To do so, I will focus for the most part on the work of Rousselot and Lonergan. As editor and translator of three of the four volumes in a new series that will publish Rousselot's philosophical works and having spent part of a sabbatical working on Lonergan and visiting the Lonergan Research Institute in Toronto, I have had opportunities to continue working on restoring affection to consciousness, in accord with Newman's Theorem, a restoration best done by an extending of the Thomist idea of connaturality.

The first thesis of *Head and Heart* is that there are as many kinds of consciousness, or ways of being in the world of persons and things, as there are kinds of intentionality, hence the subtitle: *Affection, Cognition, Volition as Triune Consciousness*. The first seven chapters establish the existence and nature of affective intentionality and of a distinct affective consciousness, irreducible to cognition or volition. I needed seven chapters because while cognition and volition are generally conceded to be intentional and therefore to be legitimate kinds of "spiritual" consciousness, feelings and moods have generally not enjoyed equal status with them. Why is this important? Why bother about redressing this imbalance?

One good reason is Newman's Theorem. Let us apply this theorem to the condition of human consciousness when affectivity is neglected. Whenever an essential third of consciousness is neglected, the remaining elements suffer distortion, consequent misunderstanding, and misuse because they have to take up the slack, so to speak, by being forced to do what the missing third is supposed to do. Cognition and volition are asked to perform affection's function; since they are not suited to do so, the result is not only reduced performance of their own functions, but an unbalanced situation and state of tension produced by their doomed attempts to perform those of that missing element. At first, the false substitutions may go unnoticed, but if enough people pay enough attention and come to identify the problem and learn how to solve it, eventually a remedy will appear, and

when it does it will seem quite obvious to all who finally notice. In other words, if affectivity is not recognized as a distinct, albeit inseparable, element constituent of human consciousness, cognition and volition will themselves be pressed into roles they cannot fill, to their own dysfunction and that of our affective lives as well.

I submit that that is exactly what has happened by the exclusion of feelings and moods from full status as intentional consciousnesses, and that a contemporary phenomenology of consciousness can help remedy this neglect of affective consciousness. Let me offer just a little more detail, using Newman's theorem, to clarify this claim before going on to update the positions of *Head and Heart*.

There are at least three clear instances of the neglect of affection in the history of philosophy and theology that readily come to mind. The first is tributary to the faculty psychology (and its concomitant metaphysics) that has bedeviled Western thought since the Greeks set the agenda and terminology in the fifth century B.C.E. By faculty psychology, I mean what now is (or should be) generally recognized as a methodologically misleading tendency to name and posit, as though to explain our conscious operations, a vast array of invisible and non-experiential entities or principles like soul and body, intellect and will, reason and sensibility, spirit and matter, and the like. Biblical language did little to counter or correct this tendency, for it too spoke in similar terms. Lonergan put it this way on one occasion:

A faculty psychology divides man up: it distinguishes intellect and will, sense perception and imagination, emotion and conation, only to leave us with unresolved problems of priority and rank. Is sense to be preferred to intellect, or intellect to sense? Is intellect to be preferred to will, or will to intellect? Is one to be a sensist, an intellectualist, or a voluntarist? The questions vanish, once one has ceased to think in terms of faculties or powers. What is given to *consciousness is a set of interrelated intentional operations*. Together they conspire to achieve both cognitional and real

self-transcendence. Such is the basic unity and continuity. ("Faith and Beliefs" 8-9; my italics)

If we are not to fall into just another version of faculty psychology by making affection, cognition, and volition but names for faculties, we must remind ourselves that a major difference between the intellect and the will as faculties and the triad of consciousness as interrelated intentional operations is that the former are not directly experienced and the latter are. The latter are operations we perform, and they are conscious, that is, immediately available both in their actual performance and as able to be objectified as the data of consciousness. But that is not enough; we also have to avoid attributing knowing to cognition or loving to affection in any exclusive way, for that would divide us up just as badly as faculty talk. It is always the person who knows and loves, always the whole subject who acts, and what we are at pains to do is correct one mistake without falling right into another. The terms "head" and "heart," at least, are so obviously metaphors for cognition and affection, rather than faculties, that they are less likely to be taken literally even by someone still in the thrall of faculty psychology.

Now one of Lonergan's chief claims about Aquinas was that like so many who have written about consciousness, Thomas' *method* and *practice* were often more instructive and more reliable guides for us today than his *theory*, especially as expressed in the terms of the faculty psychology and metaphysics of his day. His explicit language did not usually transcend the limitations of his time as well as his actual performance did. This very insight is, in fact, at the core of transcendental Thomism's ability to enter into mutually fruitful dialogue with philosophy and theology today. An especially provocative instance of this is the concept of connaturality found throughout Aquinas' writing and brought to contemporary attention primarily by Rousselot and Maritain, but also by Ricoeur and others; I will focus on this later. The point here is that because of a metaphysics of soul as spirit and of a faculty psychology that spoke and thought in terms of (spiritual) intellect and (spiritual) will as belonging properly to the (spiritual) soul, while it spoke of the feelings and affections as practically

equated with sensibility and thus as belonging to the physical and material body, we ended with a two-part soul in Aristotle and his disciple Aquinas. Affection as a distinct intentionality was driven from the soul, and despite Plato's tripartite soul and Augustine's *cor inquietum*, the tradition of a two-part soul prevailed. The result was that the operations of affective consciousness were mistakenly attributed to either intellect or will, when they were considered spiritual, or to sense and embodiment, when they were not. This dualism is evident in the language of Descartes, Kant, Hegel, and in every philosopher and theologian who thought and wrote from within a faculty psychology and the metaphysics derived from it.

The second instance follows directly from this first and perfectly illustrates Newman's Theorem of phenomenological neglect, if I may so name it: for lack of a way to talk about love as it really is experienced, the medieval solution was to make love an act of the will. Under the terms and conditions of a faculty psychology, love had to come from and be attributed to some faculty, despite the obvious physical and passionate side of love, since spiritual beings like God and the angels were not to be denied the power to love; but since they had no bodies, love had to become a will-act. The "better" and higher love then became an act of will, much to the disparagement of the "worse" and lower. The limitations of a faculty psychology forced this improper attribution and reinforced the neglect of affection. Love as felt, as affective response, lived a double life, once in the body and senses, and again in the will, where it took on a special jargon (intention and fruition becoming aliases for desire and joy). At the same time, there has always been an interest in affective consciousness and some serious work done to give it the attention it deserves (see Alquié; Bernard; Davis; Guérin; Noble; Schrag; Simonin; Strasser 1969, 1970, and 1977; Sweeney).

The third instance is one that anyone in tune with Newman's Theorem might have foreseen: today we have philosophers like Robert Solomon and Martha Nussbaum saying that emotions and passions are judgments, which is just another reduction — this time mistaking affection for cognition, whereas the medievals mistook affection for volition (see Chenu and Guillaumont). In all

these instances, which I cite here merely as examples, not only is affection neglected but cognition and volition are misunderstood and distorted by being said to accomplish what they do not and cannot. Naturally, therefore, we have thoroughly confused attempts to figure out the so-called cognitive content of feelings and moods, or to understand how love can be reduced to a commandment within the language and thought patterns of a philosophical and biblical tradition that tries to deal with affection while excluding it from equal status with cognition and volition. We have reached critical mass on this issue, and replacing faculty psychology with intentionality analysis is our best hope for method in the human sciences. (A few nonphilosophical works that try to integrate affection into consciousness have also caught public, even popular, attention; see, for example, Damasio; Goleman; MacLean 1980, 1990; Restak; Veldman).

Please do not misunderstand me and end up with no more than another version of the same mistake. I am not excluding cognition or volition from love, nor affection from knowledge, certainly not from value judgments, but simply trying to show by philosophical argument that the exclusion of affection from consciousness has led to presenting knowledge and love as though they were better off without feeling. That exclusivist, faculty-centered approach is a perfect instance of Newman's Theorem: first the omission, and then the attempt to justify it, with all the involved elements suffering distortion. The restoration of affection to full status in "spiritual" consciousness (to revert to the terms used to exclude it) goes awry if we do not go all the way from faculty psychology through intentionality analysis to the unity of the subject, and do not stop halfway by limiting love to affection or knowledge to cognition in ways that make them allergic to one another.

So the answer to the question "Why bother?" should be obvious: because it's good for all three kinds of intentionality that constitute triune human consciousness. Cognition will not have to carry the burden of value judgments without the value apprehensions that occur in feelings, and volition will not have to account for the absurd hypothesis that makes love an act of will, almost always to the disparagement of feeling. There is not a single act of

the subject that is not constituted by all three intentionalities of triune consciousness. We do not pursue knowledge without deciding to do so, nor appropriate our emotional lives responsibly without reflection and decision to do so, and so on. This triadic structure operates throughout the full range of conscious life. But of the three currents that make up the one stream of consciousness, affection needs the most work to find and hold its place. Intentionality analysis, as replacing and remedying faculty psychology, makes this possible by offering the thesis that feelings and moods are best understood as affective intentionalities.

Affective Intentionality

To take seven chapters to establish affective intentionality, while it may seem to be too much (one would hope) for most philosophers today, is apparently still not enough for others. We might well ask why. Why is the transition from faculty psychology to intentionality analysis so difficult for us? No doubt because we are creatures of habit, and having all learned to speak and think philosophically at the feet of Plato and Aristotle right down to today, with the blessing and reinforcement of the language of the Bible, we probably find our *Denkformen* so fixed that it must seem revolutionary to think in any other way. The phenomenological movement is about method, of course, and the single unifying factor across most of the figures associated with what has been called (and then uncalled) existentialism, and even including a great part of what goes by the name “postmodern,” is the phenomenological method. The heart and soul of that method is intentionality. To jettison intentionality and the analysis of consciousness in terms of intentionality would be to forgo the single most important remedy for faculty psychology and its metaphysics. I have little to add to *Head and Heart*’s first seven chapters except to suggest that what Rahner calls *Vorgriff* should be understood not as solely cognitive but as the stream of triune consciousness toward what Levinas calls *l’Infini* (the Infinite, consistently mistranslated as Infinity in the English). Neither *Vorgriff* nor *l’Infini* is a cognitive abstraction nor a knowable object, on the one hand, nor a presence or absence subject to

voluntary control, on the other, but both are unoverridable structures of consciousness, together naming a transcendence of everything and everyone finite toward a horizon that is not only horizontally but vertically infinite, toward a “ground” that is a “height” (or “depth”) more than a “ground,” and that is always figured but never a figure, always personal without being a person, desired without being needed (in the sense of necessary for a hypothetical “natural” rather than a “supernatural” life). Were I to rewrite those chapters, I would emphasize Levinas’ contribution much more and bring him out from the background, where he silently guided their whole movement.

I would also emphasize one phenomenon in particular, that of prayer. To ask why we humans spontaneously pray is to note that prayer is the purest form of the Rahner/Levinas structure of *Vorgriff/Infini*, not just in the sense of children asking for a heavenly mother or father to come to their rescue, but in the much deeper sense of the peculiar intentionality that prayer manifests in human consciousness (see Lonergan 1996, 178-82, esp. 179). Granted the truism that not all feelings are intentional — as von Hildebrand has clearly spelled out, and as Lonergan has followed him, there are certain unintentional physical states like fatigue and irritability, or certain goal-oriented tendencies, like hunger and thirst, that may appear to be intentional but are more accurately and parsimoniously explained by routine causality — we need look no further than inside ourselves for their adequate intelligibility, since they are explained by causes, not by intentions. But one thing distinctive about affective intentionality is the primacy (or at least the enhanced degree of the importance) of the “Other,” i.e., of a degree of passivity or receptivity so much greater than that experienced in insight that Lonergan often calls feeling a *quasi*-operator, as though reluctant to grant it as much activity as cognition (although it must be said that the receptive nature of knowledge cannot be denied: I can no more promise to understand Einstein’s relativity theory — that is, promise to have an insight — than I could promise to feel a certain emotion, because both truths and values have to be given to me as gifts to my questions and desires, no matter how great my effort).

There is a vast domain, the world of value, parallel to that of truth, the domain of cognition, which a fuller reading of Rahner includes in the *Vorgriff* (perfectly consequent with Roussetot's "good" intellectualism, which recognizes in the *intellectus agens* much more than a cognitive operation but rather the defining kinesis of finite spirit as such) and which Levinas names the trace of the Other, the Infinite, who, like Descartes' idea of the Infinite, functions to give human consciousness its specific human bend and curve, making it personal and ethical. The Infinite's ethical reality emerges with the advent of the human Other (i.e., another person), an approach that is mediated, to be sure, by embodiment, by that ambiguous first otherness of my own flesh which I both and neither am and have; this is the face of the Other, which in Levinas' philosophy gets its ethical power from connaturality with the trace of the Other whose trace in consciousness is the Infinite (Tallon 1995). That Infinite, never an object, is operative in all knowing and loving of persons and things, revealing their finitude and our own finitude. For twenty-five centuries, we have been offered the contemplation of truth as the human ideal, but we need reminding that we are more than a desire to know — desire for more than a beatific "vision" — for it is the desire of a person, and for a person there must be a person. Prayer, both human and divine (Nédoncelle), is in this context but the purest and simplest spontaneous affective intentionality of a person for a person and is the primary connatural attunement of human consciousness to its infinite Other (the mystical eros and pathos), who meets the face of the finite Other as the one for whom I am responsible before I know it or will it (the ethical eros and pathos).

Lest this seem overly rhapsodic, let me immediately wrench us back to terra firma with the methodological caution that only in inclusive intentionality analysis will this make sense. To stay locked inside a faculty psychology is to continue to speak of sensibility, intellect, and will and then refuse to use analogy to allow the metaphysics of spirit and matter derived from that faculty psychology to extend to affection. The result is an easy dismissal of affection from the core of consciousness as though unequal to cognition and volition. To make more sense of the

relation of prayer as personal attunement to the ground of consciousness, I need now to come back to the pivotal theme of connaturality.

Connaturality and Feeling

A person is a who and a what. Persons are grounds (and depths and heights, to use spatial metaphors; we could as well (or even better) use less visual and more temporal, historical ones), and what we know about them is the sum of figures on those grounds. This Gestalt structure seems unavoidable in all our senses and in all conscious operations, in our affections, cognitions, and volitions. There is always a background, a context, a field in or against which or whom the object or subject of affection, cognition, or volition is placed, projected, situated, contextualized, figured. This figure-ground structure can never be transcended and never is, no matter how many times a former ground is placed against a new ground and becomes a figure itself, as when I write something or sketch some picture on a blackboard. At first the blackboard is the ground and is co-known nonobjectively (and usually just plain ignored, not even noticed) along with the word or picture on the blackboard, which is the necessary condition for knowing the word or picture. To turn the nonobject, the blackboard, into an object, I must first refocus by looking deeper into the background, past the figure; I thereby expand my horizon so that I now include the wall on which the blackboard is mounted. To know the wall, formerly a ground, as an object, I must project the three-dimensional room as its ground. And on it goes, to ever-expanding horizons that successively objectify the room, building, campus, city, state, country, planet, galaxy, universe, until I stand in imagination at the edge of space and project the whole material universe against the ground of being.

This example seems to illustrate our vision bias, but the structure pervades hearing (as when too much background noise makes the foreground inaudible, speech unintelligible), and taste (as when without a clean palate the wine or cheese doesn't have its own taste), and so on. Notice that in all these cases there's a line, limit, boundary, border, threshold between figure and ground.

When we define, we set that limit or boundary and say, "Here the object ends and the background begins." The object stands out or up or against the ground, and it's tempting to play with words and say that to "under-stand" is to "grasp" what "stands up," or that in-sight is seeing into the field and spotting the figure, or seeing past the foreground into the background. But as Lonergan has taught us, all these visual models fail to account for insight as an act of intelligence and can lead us astray: understanding is not like seeing or any of the senses. As an act of intelligence, occurring on another level of cognition, and only as intelligence performed by someone in action, it must be experienced in its own right for anyone to understand it without reducing it to vision or falsely conceiving it in terms of vision, and for that to happen, the data of consciousness must themselves become objects of cognition.

What about feeling? Do we not have a similar problem with reducing affection to cognition and volition and so falsely conceiving it in terms of the (theoretically and practically) better known (cognition) and/or better exercised (volition)? We have been told that feeling is coterminous with all four levels of human consciousness, which is already an attempt to define feeling by setting up "cognitional/volitional structure" as the better known against which to locate feeling as the less well-known. So doesn't this also tell us something about how we try to understand feeling, even when it is recognized as a distinct, affective intentionality? Even when we recognize that feeling changes as we move up in vertical finality from experience through understanding to judgment (the first three levels: cognition), and that feeling changes again at the level of decision, choice, and action (the fourth level: volition), doesn't this mode of analyzing feeling betray it to the extent that the other two kinds of consciousness set its terms of understanding? Do we have to understand feelings analogously? Should cognition set the levels, so that then we speak of empirical feelings, intelligent feelings, rational feelings, responsible feelings? Does this illuminate consciousness or only blur it more? Do we really have a choice, given that what we are attempting here is to understand feelings?

Granted then that we experience feelings, can we make the move to understanding feelings with not only the same caution we

exercise when understanding any experience, namely, not to fall into a visual bias, but with the added caution that we not fall into a cognitive bias (or volitional bias, when we try to understand feelings at the fourth level)? Can we completely reconceptualize affection by liberating it from Gestalt imagery? That's exactly the problem: feeling is never allowed its own definition, or its own terms, with its own intentionality, and is always forced to fit better known models supplied by cognition and volition. Something gets lost in the tailoring. Even Pascal's "the heart has its reasons" betrays feeling by talking about it in terms of reason, and some of Lonergan's less guarded borrowings repeat this unhelpful saying. The "heart's reasons" may be feelings in some sense, but feelings are not really reasons, nor are reasons feelings. Of what genus would feeling be a species? Only consciousness itself. If consciousness is truly triadic, its three intentionalities must really be distinct (albeit never separate), indeed so distinct that each achieves its identity and makes its unique contribution to the whole of consciousness precisely by not being the others.

Now does this line of thought help us recognize what is distinct about affective intentionality? It does, and both Rousselot and Lonergan go back to a relatively overlooked Thomist concept, that of connaturality, to explore that distinction. Not that connaturality does not operate in all of consciousness — that is not my thesis (when we explain connaturality in terms of habit as virtue, it becomes clear that since there are cognitive and volitional habits, so there will be cognitive and volitional connaturality) — but that its operation in affection is quite different from its operation in cognition or volition.

The key text for Aquinas on affection is *Summa Theologiae*, IIa IIae q. 45, a. 2. What *Summa Theologiae*, I, q. 84, a. 7 is for cognition, this text is for affection:

Whether wisdom is in the intellect as its subject?

Objection 1. It would seem that wisdom is not in the intellect as its subject. For Augustine says (Ep. cxx) that "wisdom is the charity of God." Now charity is in the will as its subject, and not in the intellect, as stated above (24, 1).

Therefore wisdom is not in the intellect as its subject.

Objection 2. Further, it is written (Sirach 6:23): “The wisdom of doctrine is according to her name,” for wisdom [*sapientia*] may be described as “sweet-tasting science [*sapida scientia*],” and this would seem to regard the appetite, to which it belongs to taste spiritual pleasure or sweetness. Therefore wisdom is in the appetite rather than in the intellect.

Objection 3. Further, the intellective power is sufficiently perfected by the gift of understanding. Now it is superfluous to require two things where one suffices for the purpose. Therefore wisdom is not in the intellect.

On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. ii, 49) that “wisdom is contrary to folly.” But folly is in the intellect. Therefore wisdom is also.

I answer that, as stated above, wisdom denotes a certain rectitude of judgment according to the Eternal Law. Now rectitude of judgment is twofold: first, on account of perfect use of reason [*secundum perfectum usum rationis*], secondly, on account of a certain connaturality [*propter connaturalitatem quandam*] with the matter about which one has to judge. Thus, about matters of chastity, a man after inquiring with his reason [*per rationis inquisitionem*] forms a right judgment, if he has learnt the science of morals, while he who has the habit of chastity judges of such matters by a kind of connaturality [*per quandam connaturalitatem*]. Accordingly it belongs to the wisdom that is an intellectual virtue to pronounce right judgment about Divine things after reason has made its inquiry, but it belongs to wisdom as a gift of the Holy Ghost to judge aright about them on account of connaturality [*secundum quandam connaturalitatem*] with them: thus Dionysius

says (Div. Nom. ii) that "Hierotheus is perfect in Divine things, for he not only learns, but is patient of, Divine things."

Now this sympathy or connaturality [*compassio sive connaturalitas*] for Divine things is the result of charity, which unites us to God, according to 1 Cor. 6:17: "He who is joined to the Lord, is one spirit." Consequently wisdom, which is a gift, has its cause in the will, which cause is charity, but it has its essence in the intellect, whose act is to judge aright, as stated above (I-II, 14, 1).

Reply to Objection 1. Augustine is speaking of wisdom as to its cause, whence also wisdom [*sapientia*] takes its name, insofar as it denotes a certain sweetness [*saporem*].

Hence the Reply to the Second Objection is evident, that is if this be the true meaning of the text quoted. For, apparently this is not the case, because such an exposition of the text would only fit the Latin word for wisdom, whereas it does not apply to the Greek and perhaps not in other languages. Hence it would seem that in the text quoted wisdom stands for the renown of doctrine, for which it is praised by all.

Reply to Objection 3. The intellect exercises a twofold act, perception and judgment. The gift of understanding regards the former; the gift of wisdom regards the latter, according to the Divine ideas, the gift of knowledge, according to human ideas.

This text, which is but one among many, has attracted some attention (D'Avenia; Faricy; Gumnior; Hayen 1957; Kadowaki; Keane; Lebacqz; Marin-Sola; McInerney; Moreno; Titus). As Kadowaki demonstrates, connaturality was not something Thomas came onto late (16); he used this concept from the *Commentary on the Sentences* all the way through his works, and there was a

definite development toward more use as he matured, especially as his practical philosophy of prudence and wisdom evolved. Aquinas says there are two ways to live our personal lives — that is, to live our relations with human persons (the ethical), and our relations with divine persons (the mystical). One way he calls the “way of cognition” (*per modum cognitionis*) — head — and the other he calls the “way of connaturality” or “by a certain connaturality” (*propter connaturalitatem quandam*) — heart — or “by inclination” (*per modum inclinationis*), or “by nature” (*per modum naturae*), literally, “by way of (one’s) nature” (see Hayen 1957, 238-55).

The first question might be: Why is this text the basis for saying that beyond the way to action based on cognition there is another way, based on affection? After all, Aquinas seems to contradict himself. He first distinguishes two ways by saying one comes from cognition and the other from nature, but then calls them both ways to judgment; but judgment is one of the operations of cognition, the very culmination of cognitional structure at the third level. How are we supposed to interpret this without contradiction? If we recall the often mentioned admonition about theory and practice, we will not allow Aquinas’ own language to mislead us into taking connaturality as just another kind of cognition, against Aquinas’ own explicit contrast of cognition with something else.

Kadowaki accuses all interpreters before him of falling into false, subjective views because they focus only on texts where the terms associated with connaturality occur literally, but they neglect the background of Aquinas’ texts necessary to understand them (87-88). He finds six conditions for a correct interpretation of connaturality, especially of the key text (*ST*, II-II, 45, 2). He is quite correct to emphasize that an accurate interpretation will focus on the dynamic character of connaturality, and thus all of his six conditions are correctly oriented around action, but all his conditions attribute too much to the will’s influence (he never does free himself from faculty psychology, so we have to try to see through it as best we can). The first three conditions place the practical orientation of intellect in its subjection to the will. In the fourth condition, he puts love in the will and then takes the usual

position of then having intellect influenced by love; this, too, is thought to fulfil the condition of being dynamic by showing a nonspeculative finality. Even his promising recourse to habit ends up by saying that the virtue of love, as gift of the Spirit, resides in the will. We never get beyond a two-part soul and a rather arid discussion of prudence and wisdom in terms exclusively of intellect and will; affection has again been absorbed. Had Kadowaki managed to break the hold of faculty psychology when discussing affection and love, which he does at length but consistently in terms of will alone, his implementation of his principles of interpretation might have worked better.

This apparent confusion has stymied every interpretation I've seen of this and related texts. No writer on the subject has managed to get past the explicit language to consider that what Aquinas means here is not, as is usually taken to be the case, at least since John of St. Thomas (Jean Poincot; see Maguire) and Maritain, that intellect is under the influence of love, because love is always in the writer's mind considered an act of will. When interpreters work from within the tradition of faculty psychology, we must remember, they allow themselves only intellect and will as the "tools" of interpretation. Even when the language of affection is used, it is attributed to will; such is the force of this example of Newman's Theorem.

But what if Aquinas means another, quite different way to get not to cognition but to action, a way different enough from cognition, namely, by affection, so that its contribution will really make a significant and important difference? We have to move away from a logocentric, cognition-centered perspective (from a presumed primacy of cognition) to an agent-centered, person-centered, subject-centered perspective (to the primacy of action) to be in a position to ask the question at all. This shift of perspective from cognition to action makes all the difference. It takes off the blinders of faculty psychology and the two-part soul and reframes the whole interpretation. Roy succeeds to some extent insofar as when discussing the gifts of the Spirit, he states that the problem is not how many gifts there are or how to divide them up between the faculties, but what they accomplish, which is to supernaturalize us and to coadapt (attune) our action in such a

way that we can know and love in accord with those gifts (1948, 174-86, 292).

Secondary questions might be: Just how, according to this text, is cognition different from affection? What really distinguishes cognition from affection? Does Thomas give a clue to how they differ? Is there anything else we know about his language here that could help? I think these questions go together in this sense: not only is affection proposed as a distinct path to action, but when first it is identified as “by way of one’s nature” instead of “by way of one’s cognition,” and then further, in the two examples, when it is precisely identified with one’s second nature, not one’s first, that is, with one’s virtues (understood as habits, acquired in the case of the ethical, infused in the case of the mystical, and in both cases, these virtues are the very attunements of first nature that make it better and so make it work more surely, quickly, and spontaneously), we then have a complete explanation. Let me try to show this.

How does connaturality itself work? Aquinas explicitly answers that question when he says that the “other way,” different from the way of cognition, is the way of virtue. It’s a perfectly consistent position for him to take, given that virtues are (good) habits and that habits are second nature, for then connaturality is really a statement about how this second nature operates, and he merely gives a name to this way to action, a way that flows more from (second) nature than from knowledge. A nature is, after all, just a principle of action; actions reveal natures and define them. Connaturality says that we can attune our first nature so that its action can become easier, more congenial, more intuitive (not needing discursive reasoning), more spontaneous (not needing voluntary deliberation) and more “natural” than it is without the appropriate virtue. This is Charles Davis’ “achieved spontaneity” (140). It is the “resonance” that Lonergan speaks of in the marvelous section on art and patterns of experience, especially on feeling as the most purely experiential, as elemental meaning, as non-conceptual, as presenting rather than representing; there (with a bow to Merleau-Ponty) he describes my body as “a piece of space that feels,” describes bodies as feelers in kinesthetic space (1993, 211-32).

With the suitable virtue, we are already in motion toward the action, inclined toward it, leaning into it; we are “suited” to it because it “befits” us, and we have sympathy and affinity with the values associated with such actions; we have a feel for them, are in touch with them. Whereas a phenomenology of cognition might be expressed in terms of objectifying, grasping, mastering a subject, and so on, a phenomenology of affectivity might be expressed in terms of leaning, tilting, inclining, being moved, being touched, and therefore expressed as an affective response to being affected, so much so that the proverbial “falling” in love would be on a continuum with this leaning over so far as to fall, that is, to lose oneself in, to, and for the other. Without making too much of such poetic descriptions, we can at least note that the striking difference between cognition and affection comes to the fore when we recontextualize them both by making action primary. Cognition and affection are two complementary and inseparable although distinct ways to get to the ethical thing to do, or, in the case of the mystical, two ways to pray. These two personal (intersubjective, social) worlds, the ethical and the mystical, set the paradigm for affection.

It may seem that recourse to connaturality attempts to explain the obscure by the more obscure, which is why I have been at pains to get past the term connaturality to its underlying structure. On the surface, “con”+“natural” means a nature plus whatever goes with it and is attuned to it, whatever actions and values resonate in harmony with it (and in *Head and Heart* I try to cover the full range of meanings of this “going with”).

Connaturality and Personal Becoming

There is another textual clue that while too much should not be made of it, at least something should. This is the very phrase itself, *per modum naturae*. Might there be an allusion, no matter how distant, in the phrase *per modum naturae* to the fact that angels act more through their natures than through either their “faculties” (presumably not so distinct from their natures as ours) or through the even more derivative agency of “intelligible species” reached, as are ours, by *conversio ad phantasmata*? Recall

Joseph de Finance's idea of habit as remedy for finitude. Habit is virtue or second nature, improving first nature, bringing it closer to the angelic nature. If Aquinas is saying that in connaturality we act through our nature (we act "by nature," "by heart"), might he not be (however distantly) alluding to an approximation to the mode of operation of our (distant) cousins, those less finite spirits to whose least performance stands to our best performance as its asymptotically approached upper limit? What in us is spread out in a *spargi ad multa* among disparate faculties and their so-called proper objects, can become, at the high end, by an operational synthesis of affection, cognition, and volition, an approximation of knowing and loving *per modum naturae* — that is, by connaturality, after our angelic models.

That is, of course, the familiar thesis of Rousselot's *Intellectualism of Saint Thomas*, namely, that discursive reasoning and deliberative willing are substitutes for a higher mode of connatural knowing and loving that are transformed into those higher operative modes by the presence of affection, that is, by including in the triad the missing third of consciousness, the element of affection and empathy that allows us to feel the consonance and dissonance, encourages us to respect the feelings of attunement, of harmony, of good and bad "vibes," of the consolation and desolation that Ignatian spirituality finds essential to discernment of spirits. The genius of Rousselot's "good intellectualism" — or "more full-blooded intellectualism," as the *Downside Review* critic cited by D'Arcy calls it (324-25) — is to restore the full triad of consciousness so that human knowing and loving are not forced into "dyadic soul" explanations that omit affection. That is also the brilliance of Rousselot's *The Problem of Love in the Middle Ages*, namely, to give much more room for human affection in the phenomenology of love. Even though historically "stuck" in faculty psychology, he manages to free himself enough to suggest to us today a Thomas whose "intellect" and "will" were fully charged with an ecstatic, passionate desire that refused to deny the affective third of consciousness.

But the most important help Rousselot gives us in understanding the role of connaturality is achieved because he gets beyond the literal reading of it as restricted to cognition (the usual

potency to act, will be for him to tend to this conquest, to this adequation. So it is, therefore, on the one hand, that the sense of the operation characteristic of humanity, which is its intellection, ought to be taken from the innate desire which the human subject has of equalizing itself, of winning its own nature; on the other hand, that the specific note of this intellection is the distension which we have said exists between the nature conceived and the subject (exterior) connoted. At the moment when the interior distension of man ceases, the representative distension, the distension of his concept, will also cease. Man would *envisage* his essence, his substantial self; man would live his soul, his whole soul, and at the same time, he would know exterior being by sympathetic intuition. All material *apathy* would vanish in spiritual *sympathy*; not having in itself a remainder to reduce, the soul too would no longer find an obstacle in penetrating objects. In short, the deep root of the conceptual distension, of the abstraction proper to the category of thing, is the incompleteness of our spirituality; if man cannot bring his object to light, it is because he is not himself enlightened. (D'Arcy, 318-19; italics in original)

D'Arcy reads Rousselot as offering us a paradigm for human action not from the low end, from the bottom up, as though what defines us were to limit us, but from above, inviting a transcendence, as Levinas puts it, toward a vertical horizon. Insofar as we approach the angelic model, we do not so much transcend our nature as actuate it, and in so doing, simplify its operations, somewhat in the manner of Teilhard de Chardin's "all that rises, converges." Affective connaturality works to make this experiential, and we could describe such a person thus:

He has reached a stage near to that of Rousselot's connaturality or sympathetic vibration. The law of the intelligence is that "a spirit who would be *self-conscious*, could penetrate to the heart of the real. 'The more spirit one has,' says Pascal, 'the more original things one sees' and for the pure spirit, there are only originals. He, who is all spirit, is all affinity with beings, all *noumenal affinity*; everything real is sympathetic to him, all his quality is 'connatural' to him; he does not find there, to speak in Hegelian language, a '*suchness*' which he comes up against, but he insinuates himself and flows into the inmost place where we cannot penetrate. The pure spirit, says St. Thomas, knows the individual in its very singularity; the human soul abstracts at its own opportunity the idea of quiddity. Still absent from itself, how could it *apply* itself entirely to objects?" (320-21; italics in original)

The idea of connaturality is therefore less a limited theory about practical judgments, despite its being usually and almost exclusively so presented, than a general concept of human development toward its natural and personal fulfillment, which is toward action through (and identified with) one's nature or being. Such action, like second nature, is the product of virtuous habit, and is thus more spontaneous, more perfect, and so on; in a word, it is more like a natural appetite than an elicited appetite. Fred Lawrence indirectly confirms this general line of thinking, here based on Rousselot, by drawing on Lonergan. Beginning with the comment that

the reason why human beings form an inner word in order to know is the lack of coincidence of *esse naturale* and *esse intentionale* whenever created beings know something. Hence, the finite knower has to form a surrogate copy and present it to itself in order to know any real thing: this

may be the inner word or concept that we fashion for ourselves, or it may just as well be an imagined representation (*Vorstellung*) that substitutes for the *esse naturale* of the thing known. (396)

But suppose we could dispense with the surrogate because there was no such lack of coincidence between our nature and our intentions? Suppose, like Aquinas' *homo castus*, there was connaturality between oneself and one's intended deed? One would then act from feeling that very sympathy, without needing to think, to reason, to know (at least not as the operative intentionality in this action at this moment, without excluding later reflection, concomitant cognitive consciousness of oneself as an acting subject, or later acknowledgement of one's responsibility, and so on) because of the union of *esse naturale* and *esse intentionale*. Indeed, we might think of connaturality as just that union.

We have here another expression of the meaning of connaturality, one emphasized by Miller: connaturality allows us to know through our being or nature, or, better to act through our being or nature rather than through our knowing. Lawrence develops this in presenting Lonergan's exposition of Verbum: "we know by what we are rather than by what we produce" (410). Aquinas advanced Augustine's noetic "by adding to Aristotle's theorem of knowledge by identity a theorem of knowledge by intentionality." Knowledge as knowing by what we are is proper only to God and needs the addition of intentionality to account for finite knowing. But Aquinas does not abandon the former in offering the latter; the lower is a participation by analogy with the higher:

Ontologically expressed, the possibility of finite self-transcendence in knowing is this: the ultimate ground of our knowledge is God, but the reason why we know is within us. It is the light of our intellects; and by it we can know because "the very same . . . intellectual light which is in us is nothing other than a certain participated likeness of uncreated light" (*ST*, I, q. 84, a. 5). (Lawrence, 411)

Conclusion: Restoring Affection to Triadic Consciousness

Intentionality is a finite, deficient participation in infinite knowing through self-identity, self-presence, self-possession. To the precise extent of our finitude, we must have recourse to intentional consciousness to know and love. What is natural to infinite spirit is intentional for finite spirit; analogy allows us to place them on a continuum, like the Perudo-Dionysian hierarchy of spirits so dear to Aquinas. The goal is finite self-transcendence toward an appropriation of one's own God-given, God-illuminated, and God-blessed nature. This transcendence requires the steady development so emphasized by Lonergan, but that development is by a series of leaps. The model Lonergan follows (in *Insight*) is first knowledge (the example of leap is an insight) and later, in *Method in Theology*, we find the development of affectivity given special emphasis as growth we are called to in virtue and value apprehension. In both cases, the leap has the character of a conversion; one's mind is turned away, for example, from the model of knowing as taking a look, and one's heart is turned away from subjective preferences toward what is objectively good.

Now in all this, we should be alert to notice that what Rousselot calls a substitution or a surrogate for knowing through one's being or nature, namely, intentionality, is never completely transcended — we never stop being human, after all — but this takes nothing away from also recognizing that intentionality gets its innermost meaning and value from being our way of overcoming finitude on the way toward action through our more perfectly operating nature, when a more perfect synthesis of intentional operations occurs as we are connaturalized to the ultimate Truth and Value in which we participate.

Finally, theology reminds us again that virtue can be both acquired and (by grace) infused, that is, given as a gift (the gifts of the Spirit are virtues, traditionally faith, love, and hope), elevating our nature (a nature created "a little less than the angels"): "God's gift of his love is the cause of our knowledge of God by connaturality" (Lonergan 1985, 250). Grace can raise us higher and make us a little closer by healing us, a further remedying of finitude (*sanans et elevans*), making our performance, as Lonergan (1971)

says so well, statistically a little closer to the angels. This grace from above is Lonergan's main instance of conversion, his favorite scriptural quotation having to do with God's love poured forth into us, flooding our hearts; it is also the same as his self-transcendent subject, who is at once the criterion of truth and value (the good), which is, as he explicitly says, also the same as Aristotle's virtuous person.

The contemporary recovery of the affective cannot be accomplished by attributing feeling to will, or by locating passion solely in "the body," or by reducing consciousness to brain states without intentionality, or by calling emotions judgments. Only when feeling is understood as an irreducibly distinct but never separate intentionality in its own right will consciousness be described as it is experienced and its triadic structure be recognized, accepted, and allowed to become fully operative in explanatory and problem-solving analyses of ethical and mystical experiences. There are resources in the Thomist concept of connaturality as explicitly or implicitly deployed in philosophy and theology today, as the example of Rousselot and Lonergan, among others, amply demonstrates, to advance the task of restoring affection to triune consciousness.

Notes

1. I certainly do not wish to deny the general usefulness of the first order interpretation of connaturality in Aquinas, as exemplified by Pope Pius XII's encyclical *Humani generis*, which I quote for its succinct summary:

Never has Christian philosophy denied the usefulness and efficacy of good dispositions of soul for perceiving and embracing moral and religious truths. In fact, it has always taught that the lack of these dispositions of good will can be the reason why the intellect, influenced by the passions and evil inclinations, can be so obscured that it cannot see clearly. Indeed St. Thomas holds that the intellect can in some way perceive higher goods of the moral order, whether natural or supernatural, inasmuch as it experiences a certain

“connaturality” with these goods, whether this “connaturality” be purely natural or the result of grace; and it is clear how much even this somewhat obscure perception can help the reason in its investigations. (cited in McNerny, 173)

2. D’Arcy mentions that Ralph Harper translated three of Rousselot’s articles, which D’Arcy used (379); he also mentions that Harper wrote an excellent introduction to them and that he (D’Arcy) believed they were to be published. Unfortunately, they never were. I wrote Mrs. Ruth Harper, Ralph Harper’s widow, hoping she could find these translations among his papers, but she reported that there were no unpublished papers of any kind left behind. This fact, along with Gerry McCool’s remark in a review of *Eyes of Faith* that Rousselot’s book on love and those articles (there are actually five; see Works Cited) should be translated, confirmed my resolve to make all of Rousselot’s philosophical works available. In my judgment he is the most original genius of all the so-called transcendental Thomists who have transformed twentieth century Thomism, not despite but through Aquinas. See the forthcoming: Pierre Rousselot, S.J., *Collected Philosophical Works*. Volume I: *The Intellectualism of Thomas Aquinas*, new translation with an introduction and notes by Andrew Tallon. Volume II: *The Problem of Love in the Middle Ages*, translated with an introduction by Alan Vincelette; *Philosophical Articles*, translated with an introduction and notes by Andrew Tallon. *Journals and Course Notes*, previously unpublished materials from the Archives of the Jesuit Province of France, edited, translated, and with an introduction and notes by Andrew Tallon. All four volumes will be published by Marquette University Press over the next three years.

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