

Some Comments on the Encyclical
Veritatis Splendor of Pope John Paul II:
Jewish and Philosophical

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1. Introduction

At the *prima facie* level, it might seem rather inappropriate for a Jewish thinker to offer comments on an encyclical that the Supreme Pontiff of the Roman Catholic Church has specifically addressed to his fellow bishops, whom he designates as “venerable brothers in the episcopate.” What would we Jews say if a Catholic thinker offered his or her comments on a responsum written by a rabbinical authority to other rabbis, or even to Jewish laypeople? Nevertheless, *Veritatis Splendor* is not a document that is confined to matters that only apply to

Roman Catholics, be they clergy or laity. Its concern is not with specifically "Church" dogmas or practices. It is, instead, a document that addresses *ab initio* "the ultimate religious questions" and "the moral conscience" (sec. 1).¹ Surely, these are not matters that are confined to the Roman Catholic faithful. They are matters of universal human concern. Moreover, they are matters of specific concern to faithful Jews, with whom the Pope has insisted more than once the Church stands in a unique relationship, one closer than it has with any other religious community in the world.² Indeed, in the Jewish tradition too, there have also been statements that have addressed a wider world than just that of Jewry, statements as early as some of the utterances of the biblical prophets.³ By their very nature, these statements too have surely intended some sort of response from those to whom they have been addressed. Finally, the Pope has been and remains a philosopher, who has incorporated philosophical reflection in his papal statements. As such, comments that come from the larger world, comments of a Jew, and comments that concentrate on the philosophical content of this encyclical in particular, are certainly in order. Indeed, the whole career of this pope has demonstrated his sincere desire for dialogue with the larger world, with Jews, and with philosophers.

2. *The Relation of Truth and Goodness*

Although the basic questions of faith and morals are perennial, the immediate historical condition that has prompted the Pope to speak as he does here and now is because he senses a "overall and systematic calling into question of traditional moral doctrine on the basis of certain anthropological and ethical presuppositions" (sec. 4). I can safely assume that by "traditional moral doctrine" he primarily means the doctrine of natural law, which being seen as rationally evident is thus

accessible to all intelligent humans. For him, "the natural law expresses the dignity of the human person and lays the foundation for his fundamental rights and duties, it is universal in its precepts and its authority extends to all mankind" (sec. 51). Thus the "anthropological and ethical presuppositions," which seem to be at work in the thought of those Catholic moral theologians whom the Pope sees as straying from the authentic teaching of the Church, are taken to be those that either weaken natural law or ultimately deny it altogether.

Those Catholic moral theologians, who certainly have much in common with many other moral theorists elsewhere today, are judged to be those who "detach . . . human freedom from its essential and constitutive relationship to truth" (sec. 4). Later, he sees "the question about morally good action" as being one that must be brought "back to its religious foundations, to the acknowledgment of God . . . the final end of human activity" (sec. 9). Two sentences earlier, he says "the goodness that attracts and at the same time obliges man has its source in God, and indeed is God himself." The relation between all of these terms raises many questions, but the chief question seems to be: What is the relation between God as truth and good human action? More formally, one can see this as the question of the proper relation between ontology and ethics.

In any relation of ontology and ethics (which all moral theorists by no means affirm, but John Paul II certainly does) ontology must be constituted priorly, that is, being is to be seen as prior to action. The key to this question seems to be the dual designation of God as both "source" and "end" of good human action. The meaning of this dual designation of God is by no means easily ascertained. For it could be argued that a "source" and an "end" are mutually exclusive of each other, or they only function in tandem as regards God when natural law is precluded. This dilemma can be seen in four different ethical theories.

First, in those ethical theories grounded in Platonic or Aristotelian ontologies, God is the end of human action but is not its source. That is, in a world constituted as essentially teleological, all action ultimately intends an end which is insuperable. Such an end is good *per se*, the *summum bonum*. Thus everything points to it, but it only points to itself. In Aristotle's classical formulation, it is "thought thinking itself."⁴ That is the highest end towards which all intelligent beings aspire. This end of all ends is itself incapable of any transitive relationships because any such involvements would compromise its immutable perfection. It is pure object to everything beneath it; it is only a subject for itself. Transitive action, conversely, would mean that God functions differently at different times, hence God is not immutable. For temporality is by definition transition from one moment to another. Even to designate God as a person (namely, a "thinker") is at best metaphorical. And God is only a source in the way that a major premise is a source of a logical proposition, that is, a ground having consequents. However, it is not a source in the more realistic way we would use the term as, for example, "Leonardo is the source [maker] of the Mona Lisa." For source in this realistic sense entails a relationship with a product, and that relationship can only be transitive, thus temporal. On these grounds, it is contrary to the immutability of God as the supreme *telos* of all other activity to be engaged in any transitive/temporal relationships.

By contrast, all other, non-divine activity (including human activity) is transitive and is thus necessarily temporal. For this reason, moral theories that are teleological in this primary ontological sense (that is, where ends are already there objectively, and are not simply values projected subjectively) cannot coherently see God as the real source of good human action. That source is in human persons themselves, who have the perspicacity to discern the good, and the freedom to act *towards* it (but not *from* it) in time.⁵

Second, in those ethical theories we now usually designate as "deontological," that is, those based on the priority of obligation over purpose, there is a source of obligation, but that source is in no way the end of the obligation. In some of these theories, God is precluded from being the source of obligation at all. Thus if the autonomy of moral agents themselves is seen as the source of obligation, then the Pope is right when he asserts "With regard to man himself; such a concept of autonomy . . . eventually leads to atheism" (sec. 39). For even when there is an attempt to find some place for God in such an ethical theory, that "God" is always secondary to the prime autonomy of human nature. Thus, for example, Kant's attempt to affirm the existence of God as a "postulate" of pure practical reason makes this God the means for linking the real world of the senses to the ideal world of practical reason, both of which are already present for human existence.⁶ Some of us today would call such an invented deity a "God of the gaps." But, surely since Anselm, one cannot convincingly even use the word "God" without intending "that which nothing greater than can be conceived."⁷ Such a "god" is no God *de facto*, even if mentioned *de jure*.

Third, if God is considered to be the source and end of moral action in a deontological ethical theory, then natural law cannot be included in it. For if morality is seen as being confined to what God has directly commanded by revelation in history, such as the revelation at Mount Sinai to Moses and Israel, and if that revelation is both *from* God (*qua* source) and *for the sake of* God (*qua* end), such a historical revelation is still addressed to a singular community and not to humankind *in se*.⁸ Moreover, even if it be posited that this singular community of revelation is to extend itself or be extended by God to all humankind ultimately, that means that humankind *in se* will be included into the life of the singular community. Thus humankind lies on the horizon of the singular

community of revelation, not within its background, in this view. Humankind in general is thus overcome (to use Hegelian language, it is *aufgehoben*) by the singular community of revelation; it is not continually presupposed by it. In other words, the connection between the singular community and humankind generally lies at the eschatological juncture of revelation and redemption, not at the ever contemporary juncture of creation and revelation. But if this is the case, there can be no pre-revelational morality already known in advance through the natural order of creation.⁹ Hence no natural law is possible here: For the theological premise of this view allows no a priori role either for humankind *in se* or human reason *per se*.

Fourth, morality can be seen as something God has effectively turned over to humans after creation; as the Pope characterizes this view (which he rejects), "human reason exercises its autonomy in setting down laws by virtue of a primordial and total mandate given to man by God" (sec. 36). But when this is the case, natural law becomes the non-ontologically grounded "natural rights" of the social contract theorists. And, in this view, these natural rights become not only necessary for human fulfillment but sufficient for it as well. The relationship with God here turns out to be, at best, offering thanks for past services rendered, but not a living, perpetual relationship with the Presence who is with and for humans.¹⁰ In other words, it makes revelation in history and its continual commemoration by a historically self-conscious community superfluous. Moreover, since human reason now functions here independently, the continuing affirmation of an original divine source adds no intelligibility to ethical reasoning. By means of "Ockham's Razor," it should be rejected as having useless premises. And it might actually burden ethical reasoning with concerns that seriously divert our attention from the moral urgencies ever before us. The God of

the past is to be left in memory, but not commemorated in present action. Here man is God's successor, who can only succeed if God remains in retirement. Nietzsche was right when he concluded that such a "God is dead (*tot*)," which does not mean that God never has been, but that God "has died" (*starb*), that God is past, and the present and the future now belong to man.¹¹ So it seems, that Jews, Christians and Muslims must show that this "god" has not been and is never to be the Lord whom they still serve.

3. *God and Natural Law*

So it would seem that if there is to be a natural law, and if that natural law is to be in perpetual relation to God as its end, are we not then left with a merely teleological God, who is ever end and never source? This might well explain Aristotle's long attraction to Jewish, Christian, and Muslim scholastics. But how could Christians be satisfied with such a God, when they stand together with us, the Jews, in affirming God as the prime source of all being and within in it all law, when they affirm God as *creator mundi*? As John Paul II affirms, "In the '10 words' of the covenant with Israel and in the whole law, God makes himself known as the one who 'alone is good' . . . in order to restore man's original and peaceful harmony with the Creator and with all creation" (sec. 10).

Now when we reach this question, I wish that the Pope had explicitly expressed himself more in the language of phenomenology with which he has previously distinguished himself philosophically, and had fallen back less on what seems to be the language of Aristotelian teleology, language that entered Catholic discourse through Thomism. To put it boldly, I have not seen the Pope thinking like a traditional Thomist in his previous writings (especially his previous philosophical writings), so why does he sound so much like one here? Has

not traditional Thomism too easily assumed that the God of Aristotle is the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob?¹² Of course, one could argue that in an encyclical, as opposed to a philosophical treatise (such as his major philosophical work, *The Acting Person*), traditional language is more appropriate, whatever philosophical problems it entails. (And, for Catholics, Thomas Aquinas has been designated *Doctor Angelicus*.) Nevertheless, in his earlier encyclicals, the Pope has not hesitated to use more modern philosophical language, such as his extensive use of “rights talk” in *Centesimus Annus*.

Not knowing the Pope’s reasons for his choice of language here or elsewhere, and not being bound to the authority of the Pope’s words *per se*, I can only attempt to supply a line of reasoning that is closer to the phenomenological approach than the language of *Veritatis Splendor*. This is a line of reasoning that cannot be taken as foreign to the concerns of the philosopher Karol Wojtyła. I do this as one who basically agrees with his insistence on the essential relation of truth and goodness, of ontology and ethics, of God and human moral action. I do so for the sake of greater philosophical clarity in expressing that insistence, and also to show how that insistence can be more deeply rooted in the patrimony of the Hebrew Bible and Judaism, which we both accept — *mutatis mutandis*.

4. Teleology

What John Paul II has not done adequately enough in this document, to my mind, is to explicate just what is meant by the term “end.” Only such a constitution can resolve the paradox we have seen earlier in speaking of God as both end and source of human moral action.

When we understand the term *end* as that which is intended (and thus as more than just a temporal limit), it can have two very different meanings. On the one hand, it can

mean a state of being as when Aristotle says that the end of human life is happiness (*eudaimonia*), which he explains to mean a state of present human activity that requires no external justification.¹³ On the other hand, end can mean a person as when Kant says that morality is treating other persons as ends in themselves (*Zweck an sich selbst*), which is to say that a person is not to be treated as a means to something else, presumably some state of activity from which this other person is excluded.¹⁴

Now we have already seen that when the term *end* is consistently used to denote a state of activity, going from ethics up to the level of ontology, as Aristotle most impressively did, we are left without God as the source of human action. And we have already seen that when the term *end* is consistently used to denote the human actor himself or herself, as Kant most impressively did, we are left without God as either source or end. And when source and end are seen as only functioning in specific revelation, then we are left without any doctrine of natural law that could be consistent with this revelation. Is there any other alternative philosophically so that we can still use the terms *end* and *source* in tandem coherently, theologically and philosophically?

Despite the need to reject Kant's ethical theory on theological grounds, his use of the term *end* to denote persons might be helpful theologically if we shift his specific denotation of person from the human subject of moral action to the human object of moral action. Now in Kant's own view (and perhaps that of Aristotle as well), the other person who is the object of my moral action is discovered after I have constituted myself as a moral subject *a priori*. This other person, then, is essentially an analogue of my fully self-conscious moral personhood.¹⁵ Our commonality is our mutual autonomies interacting *a posteriori*. Authentic human community, what Kant called a "kingdom of ends" (*Reich der Zwecke*), is simply the projection

of what each of us has now into the future where we plan to exercise it more fully together.

But what if, by a phenomenological constitution of the moral realm (following some but not all the points of the man who seems to be the Pope's favorite Jewish philosopher, Emmanuel Levinas), I discover that the object of my moral concern presents himself or herself to me *before* I have constituted myself as a moral subject?¹⁶ We then have a very different concept of human mutuality. For here both the source and the end of my action are one and the same by the very act of the other person presenting himself or herself to me, without my prior permission as it were.

This other person's very existence (*qua* source) is attractive (*qua* end) to me. My existence is the same to him or her. Our mutuality is not something that each of us already has; rather, it is something new and unexpected, wherein we co-exist, going together into a largely unpredictable future. Each of us, then, to a certain extent, is a revelation to the other. Furthermore, my constitution of myself as a moral person is not initially based on my inner self-perceptions but, rather, it is my response to the presence of that other person. Minimally, as we shall see, it is my preparation for such a possible personal presentation. Action is response.

5. *The Imago Dei*

What is it about the other person that I am to find attractive? Are there not many other persons who are decidedly unattractive, not only aesthetically but morally as well? Can that other person's attractiveness be anything more than his or her moral goodness, either actual or potential, that I perceive? Can the range of existential attraction include those who do not act well, and even those who cannot act at all in terms of tangible, transitive acts? None of these questions can be

answered satisfactorily by any ethics that attempts to constitute an ontology out of itself and its own operations. It inevitably reduces being to the level of immanent action and thereby obscures the transcendent dimension of human being in the world.

John Paul II does not fall into this trap because his ontology is essentially biblical. He refers to “man, made in the image of the Creator” (sec. 9). Human dignity, then, is because human beings *are* more than they ever *do* or *make* of themselves.¹⁷ But, here again, philosophical commentary is in order so that we might better appreciate the implications both of what the Pope has said and also what he has not said. Philosophical commentary must seek further clarity about what is meant by the “image of God” (*imago Dei*) and what is not meant by it.

I think that one can conceive of the *imago Dei* both positively and negatively. And each way of conceiving of it must be carefully nuanced so that wrong implications are not drawn from its assertion.

There has been a whole trend in the history of Western theology (both Jewish and Christian, where the *imago Dei* doctrine is explicitly presented, unlike Islam where it is not) to positively conceive of the *imago Dei* as consisting of some quality or capacity that man shares with God by virtue of a divine transfer at the moment of creation. Going back at least as far as Philo in the first century, many theologians have identified the *imago Dei* with reason. Just as God is the rational power in the macrocosmos, so is man the rational power in the microcosmos. Creation in the image of God means, then, that reason is what distinguishes humans from the rest of creation by enabling humans to have something substantial in common with God.¹⁸ This view nicely dovetails with philosophical notions, going back at least as far as Plato, and most widely discussed by the Stoics, that reason is what unites man and the

gods, and that reason is, therefore, what separates man from the animals.¹⁹

However, this ontology is insufficient to ground an ethics that embraces all of humankind. For by essentially identifying humanity *in se* with reason (as opposed to more modestly seeing reason as an excellence to be developed by humans whenever they can do so), there is no way one can designate those of humankind (that is, stemming from human parents) who are without this capacity as essentially participating in humanity. In our day, especially, when essential humanness is denied by some to those at the edges of human life — the unborn, the permanently and severely retarded, the irrevocably comatose — such an ontology must be rejected. The issue is now surely anything but merely academic as it once may have been. Maximally, it must be rejected because of the immoral conclusions one can draw from it, such as overt permission of abortion and euthanasia. Minimally, it must be rejected because even when its adherents avoid drawing immoral conclusions from it in practice, they are still unable to reject with adequate reason such conclusions when drawn by others.²⁰ Thus, although arguments from silence are hardly convincing by themselves, considering his public stands regarding the sanctity of all human life from conception to death, I cannot help but assume that John Paul II has avoided this type of ontology in presenting his moral theology here for the reasons just mentioned.

Positively, the Pope stresses the human capacity for a relationship with God. Such a capacity is not like reason, which is a power one has within oneself; rather, it is a possibility to participate in a relationship which itself totally encompasses the human person from without. True to his primary religious commitment as a Catholic Christian, the Pope sees that positive relationship being centered in Christ. That reality, being *mysterious* (that is, known only from within

the circle of Christian faith, and partially at that short of beatific vision), is not one that I as an outsider can authentically comment on. I cannot do that anymore than a Christian can comment on the mystery of the Jewish relationship with God.²¹ The best an outsider can do at this point is to respect the relationship and appreciate its power in the world. Philosophically, however, one can also infer that without the positive content of a revelation (be it Jewish, Christian, or Islamic), there is little chance that any relationship with God could be sustained in the world.

Nevertheless, one can conceive the *imago Dei* negatively, using the tradition of the *via negativa*, which attempts to determine what God is *not* in order to move up to a knowledge of what God *is*.²² In our case here, the *via negativa* helps us to determine what man is not, thereby preparing us to know what man is. That positive knowledge, for Jews, Christians, and Muslims, can only come from God's revelation, namely, where man's identity in relationship with God is concretely presented. This *via negativa* can be better appreciated when we look at the etymology of the Hebrew term for *imago Dei*, which is *tselem elohim* (Genesis 1:26 *et al.*).

A plausible etymology of the word *tselem* is that it might come from the noun *tsel*, which means a "shadow."²³ Now whereas an "image" positively reflects what is being "imaged," a shadow only indicates that something lies behind the blank form that is cast. A shadow is more primitive than an image since it is more inchoate. Unlike an image that gives us positive knowledge (form and content), a shadow only gives us negative knowledge, a bare outline.²⁴ Minimally, a shadow only indicates that something lies behind it. As such, it prevents us *via negativa* from making two erroneous assumptions. First, it prevents us from assuming that the shadow comes from ourselves. It thus reminds us that everything we can possibly say about the shadow is only tentative until the real presence

behind it makes itself known. Second, it prevents us from appropriating the shadow into any of our own schemes. The shadow itself is nothing without its connection to what lies behind it. As a shadow of something else, it limits what use we can make of the space that it occupies. (The relation of the shadow to its source, which thus limits our pretensions, is quite similar in its logic to the way Kant sees the relation of phenomena to the *Ding an sich*.²⁵)

Translating this into a philosophical anthropology (which is the proper juncture between ontology and ethics), that is, with a theory of human nature, we are better to see how such a *via negativa* works in terms of a minimal (hence most immediately universal) concept of the *imago Dei*. For if man is the “shadow of God,” then even before God presents himself to us in revelation, we still have some notion of why the human person cannot be definitely categorized by any category with which we determine the nature of the things of the world. Any such categorization, including the category of *animal rationale* reduces the human person to a merely worldly entity. It is thus a distortion of man’s true being, which humans themselves cannot name. No matter how much humans might share with other creatures in the world, they are always *in* the world but never fully *of* it. Any attempt to reduce human persons to some worldly category is a distortion of truth, and it inevitably leads to acts of great injustice against them as well.

The force of this negative anthropology, as it were, comes out in the great insight of the rabbinic sage Akibah ben Joseph:

Rabbi Akibah used to say that man (*adam*) is beloved being created in the image (*be-tselem*). It is an additional act of love that it is made known to him that he is created in the image as Scripture states, “in the image of God (*be-tselem elohim*) He made man” (Genesis 9:6).²⁶

Following Rabbi Akibah's line of thought, we could say that even before revelation, humans have some inchoate notion of their special loveliness (*hibbah*). But only in revelation do they learn the truth from the One who is the source of that love, and who by giving positive commandments enables humans to respond to that love as their desired end. "As for me, God is my good; I have put my refuge in the Lord God, to tell of all his works" (Psalms 73:28).²⁷ God is our end because God has performed the transitive act of self-revelation. Moral action, then, being interaction with other humans *qua imago Dei*, becomes in truth a participation in this covenant between God and his people. The other human person reflects both this source of all sources and end of all ends, whether he or she knows it or not.

But this is all preceded by the sense of being distinct *via negativa*. (As Spinoza put it, *determinatio negatio est*.²⁸) This is necessary precondition for being able to receive the positive truth of revelation. (To use a term of another philosopher from Karol Wojtyla's intellectual universe, Martin Heidegger, it might be called a *Seinlassen*, a "letting-be.")²⁹ But the second type of knowledge of human being, and by far the more important one, is that which is *made-known*. This first type, conversely, is only intuited. It is a desire, which feels its own lack before its proper object can be received.³⁰

The negative knowledge of God and the *imago Dei* has important ramifications for the precepts of natural law, which is the basic concern of *Veritatis Splendor*.

6. *Negative Ethics*

For John Paul II and the traditions he explicates, the precepts of natural law are both positive and negative. Nevertheless, at the level of universal immediacy, the negative precepts have priority. Why is this so? The encyclical answers,

“The commandment of love of God and neighbor does not have in its dynamic any higher limit, beneath which the commandment is broken” (sec. 52). What is meant here is that there is no limit to how much one may love God and neighbor; hence the observance of these precepts will vary from person to person.³¹ But there are certain acts that are, as he puts it just a few sentences earlier, “*semper et pro semper*, without exception, because the choice of this kind of behavior is in no case compatible with the goodness of the will of the acting person, with his vocation to life with God and to communion with his neighbor.”

At the most immediate universal level, the negative precepts of natural law (such as the prohibitions of murder, adultery, theft) function as a *conditio sine qua non* of a life worthy of human involvement. In Jewish tradition, the “Noahide laws” (which include the prohibitions of murder, adultery, theft), which are taken by the Rabbis to be binding on all humankind, are also negative (with the exception of the procedural social obligation to politically enforce the other, negative, prohibitions).³² The question is how these negative precepts are related to the positive precepts.

In much of Catholic natural law theory, the positive precepts are seen as being logically prior to the negative ones. This has followed the Platonic assumption that the negative presupposes the positive (as in *malum privatio boni est*).³³ Following this logic, it is assumed certain “natural goods” are apprehended. Then we conclude, anything that contradicts them is *ipso facto* proscribed.³⁴ Thus, for example, marriage is posited as a natural good and, therefore, adultery is proscribed being a contradiction of the spousal fidelity essential to that good.

The problem with this approach, which has been noted by its many theological critics, is that it seems to allow revelation only a supplementary role in presenting “super-

natural goods” that succeed the natural ones where the natural ones leave off.³⁵ However, the Pope’s emphasis on a certain priority of the negative precepts to me seems to suggest a different logic. Let us see how this logic differs from the one just presented.

If the positive precepts are not themselves natural, but are basically revealed, then one does not derive the negative precepts from them by a subsequent inversion. For, in this view, the positive precepts presuppose the negative ones as the general condition of their subsequent, singular revelation. Without both the logical and chronological priority of the negative precepts, the positive ones would have no possible place in the world to be received. The priority of the positive precepts is ontological.³⁶

Thus, for example, it is not from the general concept of the good of marriage that I infer that adultery is evil; rather, it is my absolute rejection of the moral possibility of infidelity that enables me to practice marital fidelity, whose content is much more than just the mere avoidance of multiple sexual partners. For marriage is a singular good, a sacrament, and therefore, not something that could be taken as natural.³⁷ It is the singular dedication of *this* man and *this* woman to each other in the ultimate context of their joint dedication to *this* God.³⁸ Minimally, then, marriage requires the prior prohibition of adultery (as in “forsaking all others”); but, maximally, its reality is “super-natural,” that is, revealed and singularly oriented to God. It is a covenantal reality.³⁹ But here again, the overall thrust of the Pope’s words, which I have just elaborated on, seems to require more of a departure philosophically from Aristotelian scholasticism than he is willing or able to do here. (But I am aware of the restraints of the traditional language of an encyclical where a pope enunciates the tradition of the Church rather than his own mind.)

7. *Closing Thought*

By drawing out these implications of the words of the encyclical, tapping the insights of Jewish tradition, and employing the approach of phenomenological philosophy, I have tried to enter into a dialogue with John Paul II. My differences with him are largely due to what I sense are discrepancies between his philosophical concerns and his magisterial statements here. Since I agree with his basic moral conclusions, I am only questioning his grounds for arriving at them. Hence my differences with him are more theoretical than practical. Indeed, he himself has stated here that “the church’s magisterium does not intend to impose upon the faithful any particular theological system, still less a philosophical one” (sec. 29). If that is the case, then even an outsider such as myself can respectfully suggest how the Pope’s admirable reaffirmation of moral truth could in places be made in a more persuasive way philosophically.

Notes

1. I use the official Vatican English translation of the original Latin text of the encyclical, published in *Origins: CNS Documentary Service*, 23 (October 14, 1993), pp. 297, 299 ff.

2. See John Paul II, *Crossing the Threshold*, ed. Vittorio Messori (New York: Knopf, 1994), pp. 95 ff.

3. See, e.g., Amos 1:3 ff.; Jer. 46:1 ff.; also, Maimonides, *Responsa* (Heb.), ed. Joshua Blau (Jerusalem, 1960), 1:248-249, no. 149.

4. Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 12.9/1074b35.

5. See Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 3.1/1110a15; 3.3/1112b11-15; also, Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae* I-II, q. 9, a. 3 and a. 6.

6. See *Critique of Practical Reason*, 1.2.5. Whether God is needed by Kantian ethics or is precluded by its very premises is a long standing debate among Kantian philosophers. For the first (theistic)

view, see Hermann Cohen, *Ethik des reinen Willens*, 4th ed. (Berlin: B. Cassirer, 1923), p. 455. For the second (atheistic) view, see James Rachels, "God and Human Attitudes," in *Divine Commands and Morality*, ed. Paul Helm (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), pp. 34 ff.

7. See Anselm, *Proslogion*, chap. 2; also, Karl Barth, *Fides Quarens Intellectum*, trans. I.W. Robertson (London, 1960), pp. 74-75.

8. See, e.g., Exod. 19:4-5; Isa. 43:10, 21.

9. See David Novak, *The Election of Israel: The Idea of the Chosen People* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 248 ff.

10. See John Locke, *Second Treatise of Government*, 5.25-35.

11. See Nietzsche, *Also Sprach Zarathustra*, 1.2-3; 2.2.

12. See David Novak, *Jewish Social Ethics* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), pp. 67 ff.

13. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1.12/1102a1-4.

14. Immanuel Kant, *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, trans. H.J. Paton (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), p. 101.

15. See Kant, *Groundwork*, pp. 105-106; also, Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 9.5/1166a30-34.

16. See Emmanuel Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, trans. A. Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1969), pp. 289 ff.

17. See Gabriel Marcel, *Being and Having*, trans. K. Farrer (New York: Harper and Row, 1965), pp. 131-32.

18. See, e.g., Philo, *Legum Allegoria*, 3.31-32.96; *De Opificio Mundi*, 69.

19. See Plato, *Phaedrus*, 248A; *Theaetetus*, 176A-B; Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 10.7/1177b25-1178a8; Epictetus, *Discourses*, 1.9; Cicero, *De Legibus*, 1.7.23.

20. See David Novak, *Law and Theology in Judaism* (New York: Ktav Publishing House, 1976), 2:108 ff.

21. See David Novak, *Jewish-Christian Dialogue: A Jewish Justification* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), pp. 114-15.

22. See Maimonides, *Guide of the Perplexed* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963), 1.58.

23. Note: "Man walks about as a mere shadow (*be-tselem*) . . ." (Psalms 39:7).

24. Cf. Philo, *Legum Allegoria*, 3.31:96, who employs the etymology of "shadow" (*skia*), but then identifies it with a positive "image" (*eikon*).

25. See Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, B311.

26. *Mishnah*: Avot 3.14.

27. Note the comment of Rabbi Abraham ibn Ezra (d. 1167) thereon: "And when the insightful person attains wisdom and apprehends the work of the Lord and is able to recount it to himself or to another person, then he shall attain the highest knowledge for which every human being has been created." (His commentary on Psalms is found on the margins in the standard editions of *Miqra'ot Gedolot*, the "Rabbinic Bible.")

28. Spinoza, *Epistola*, no. 50, *Opera*, ed. J. van Vloten and J.P.N. Land (The Hague: M. Mijhoff, 1914), 3:173.

29. See Martin Heidegger, "On the Essence of Truth," trans. J. Sallis, in *Martin Heidegger: Basic Writings*, ed. D.F. Krell (New York: Harper and Row, 1977), pp. 127-28.

30. Along these lines, see Acts 17:23, 28; Romans 2:14-15; Augustine, *Confessions*, 1.1.

31. See *Mishnah*: Pe'ah 1.1.

32. See *Babylonian Talmud*: Sanhedrin 56a-b, 59a; also, David Novak, *The Image of the Non-Jew in Judaism* (New York: E. Mellen Press, 1983) for a complete study of the content and history of this rabbinic doctrine.

33. See Plato, *Republic*, 409E.

34. See, e.g., John Finnis, *Natural Law and Natural Rights* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), pp. 85 ff.

35. See John Mahoney, *The Making of Moral Theology: A Study of the Roman Catholic Tradition* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), pp. 96 ff.

36. See *Babylonian Talmud*: Yevamot 3b-4a; Nahmanides, *Commentary on the Torah*: Exod. 20:8.

37. In the Talmud the word for marriage, *qiddushin*, comes from the root *qadosh*, "holy." See *Babylonian Talmud*: Qiddushin 2b and Tosafot, s.v. "d'asar."

38. See *Palestinian Talmud*: Berakhot 9.1/12d re Gen. 1:26.

39. See Mal. 2:13-16.