Chinese Foreign Policy during the Cultural Revolution (Book Review)

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non-specialists alike. Admittedly, many of the details related to the appearance and publication of the books are dry and, at times, tedious. Nonetheless, in the concluding sections to each chapter, Hegel skillfully demonstrates the link between the physical form of the novels and what these material characteristics reveal about Chinese society and culture throughout the ages. Thus, the book is of value not only to scholars of Chinese literature, but also to those specializing in the history, material culture, and art of imperial China. Comparatively, it will be of particular importance to bibliophiles, art historians, and scholars with an interest in the technology of printing.

Colège de France

Nancy Park


Barbara Barnouin and Yu Changgen's latest book explores the impact of the Cultural Revolution on Chinese foreign policy. The first of its four main chapters examines the insertion of Cultural Revolution politics into the foreign policy establishment, especially the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The second chapter traces the ideological presuppositions that guided Mao in his formulation of policy, and the remaining two chapters review the ways by which the Cultural Revolution spilled over into the conduct of diplomacy and its effect upon bilateral relations with the United States, the Soviet Union, Vietnam and Japan.

In the early phases of the Cultural Revolution the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was decimated by factional conflict that pitted younger members of the ministry staff against their superiors and generated an atmosphere of intense fear, distrust and mutual suspicion. It was in many ways a microcosm of what was happening elsewhere in the country, and as elsewhere the result was confusion, paralysis, and a decided shift to the left. Remembered by many in the West as the éminence grise of China's foreign policy establishment, one finds here Premier Zhou Enlai scrambling to maintain an element of coherence and rationality in China's external relations and to protect some of his allies (notably Foreign Minister Chen Yi).

With the foreign policy apparatus in disarray, China's foreign affairs came to be dominated more than ever by Mao Zedong. As Barnouin and Yu point out, some analysts in the West have attempted to trace the foreign policy shifts of the period to political struggle and differences of opinion held by elite groups with the Communist Party elite. Barnouin and Yu maintain, however, that from the onset of the Cultural Revolution until the mid- to late-1970s the main centers of power within the Chinese Communist Party (e.g., the Politburo and the Central Secretariat) were paralyzed, leaving foreign policy in the hands of a "personal hierarchy" at the top of which sat Mao himself. Mao's ideas and personal views on international matters were the driving force guiding policy, and Barnouin and Yu demonstrate that there was a correspondence between shifts in policy and changes in Mao's thinking. Indeed, Mao's role as the Communist Party's undisputed foreign policy leader was institutionalized as early as 1943.
and by 1949 he had emerged as the dominant personality within a policy-making constellation that placed heavy emphasis on personal leadership. Thus, Mao's domination of foreign policy was a manifestation of habits that were firmly in place long before the Cultural Revolution was conceived. Such debates as there were usually were confined to the application of principles laid down by him, while the administration of foreign policy was farmed out to government or party agencies.

As Mao monopolized policy, his ideology played a decisive role in laying the agenda. As is well known, whereas at first Mao had allied China with the Soviet Union, by 1956 he had become disenchanted with the Soviets and decided that China should take over leadership of the world revolution and aggressively promote the cause of international communism. By 1965, the process of radicalization had reached a peak: Mao identified US imperialism as a serious threat to China, called for people's war to oppose it, and labeled the USSR a revisionist state and a traitor to the revolutionary cause. Thus, by the early stages of the Cultural Revolution Chinese foreign policy was driven by Mao's conviction that the world revolution was about to enter a new stage in which revolutionary upheaval was sure to envelop the capitalist world and deal it a crushing blow. The same revolutionary ideology that factored prominently in the Cultural Revolution governed China's contacts with the outside world, and the result was a string of foreign policy disasters such as the Red Square Incident of January, 1967, and the burning of the British mission in Beijing in August of the same year.

Eventually, as the radical phase of the Cultural Revolution waned, Mao's ideological and revolutionary preoccupations gave way to cooler, more rational calculations of China's national interest, and foreign policy was de-linked from domestic politics. Once again, it was Mao himself who took the lead. By the late 1960s he had concluded that it was the Soviet Union, not the United States, that presented the greatest threat to China's interests, and as a result there was a "sea-change" in China's foreign policy. Ideological polemics continued to play a conspicuous role in public, but behind-the-scenes steps were taken to open communication with the US and prepare the way for eventual rapprochement. Barnouin and Yu show, incidentally, that Mao's efforts in this regard were assisted by activity on the American side that gave Mao the opportunity to characterize the opening to the US as a Chinese response to a US initiative.

Much of what Barnouin and Yu present is derived from secondary sources already in print. Their original contribution is limited to the first chapter which deals with the internal effects of the Cultural Revolution upon the Ministry of Foreign Affairs: There, the insights are new and they are based largely upon interviews with former Ministry of Foreign Affairs staff and rebel leaders that were conducted in Beijing between 1991 and 1993.

The book contains an appendix that includes a chronology and twenty-eight documents dating to the later phases of the Cultural Revolution, i.e., from 1967 to 1974, when Mao was attempting to stabilize the conduct of foreign relations and change its direction toward accommodation with the United States. Although Barnouin and Yu do not analyze them as such, they seem to reveal a tendency for Beijing leaders to employ ideological formulas for public consump-
tion while in their communications with one another dealing with matters more pragmatically: Apparently, despite the Cultural Revolution's encroachment upon the foreign policy domain and its disruption of normal relations, there remained a core of leaders who never entirely lost sight of China's national security needs.

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The ultimate sovereign status of the island of Taiwan, China's principal offshore territory, is not questioned by any power capable of altering it, but lesser islands are not uncontestedly Chinese. Japan contests the Senkaku Islands northeast of Taiwan. The Socialist Republic of Vietnam contests the Paracel Islands, apex of a triangle whose base runs between Vietnam and Hainan Island. The broadcast Spratly Islands are contested by the Philippines and by Malaysia.

China draws cartographic claim to the Paracels and the Spratlys by enclosing them within the great looping w-shaped line shown in Austin's Map 3. Speculating on the ontology of the line in a lengthy footnote (p. 14), Austin suggests it originated in a map of April 1935 that emanated from interdepartmental committee meetings charged by the Chinese government to "check and approve the names of 132 islands, sand cays, submerged:reefs and shoals in the South China Sea." A Republic of China source says the line first appeared on a 1948 Chinese map; a PRC source says it was a 1947 Chinese reaction to the 1945 Truman Declaration which for the first time reckoned a nation's offshore jurisdiction by its continental shelf.

Austin says, "The legal significance of this line should now be interpreted more in the chauvinistic spirit with which the PRC and ROC governments of the 1950s and 1960s approached questions of sovereignty than as evidence of likely policy intent for the late 1990s. Traces of chauvinistic spirit remain in PRC approaches to legal issues, but this has not been the dominant approach in Beijing to law of the sea issues for some time. There is reason to believe that the PRC might be prepared to abandon the w-shaped line in the South China Sea as authoritative, but it will not make this position clear until it sees just what the negotiating positions of other countries are and hence is able to refine its own. It would probably prefer to give up this line late in negotiations where the surrender could be presented as a concession." (p. 221)

Austin argues "that PRC claims to disputed offshore islands ... are motivated primarily by a strong, unshakeable conviction that these territories legitimately belong to China according to commonly accepted standards of international law" (p. 4). Regarding the several claims, he concludes, "Beijing has an undefeatable claim to sovereignty over the Paracel Islands; it has no defensible claim to the Senkaku Islands; it has a very strong claim to sovereignty of some, possibly all of the Spratly Islands ...." Inasmuch as the evidence cited throughout his book