Document Type
Peer-Reviewed Article
Publication Date
2019
Abstract
How do banks resolve a severe bad loan problem in a capital-constrained, low-income economy when a government bailout is not an option? We address this question by examining new evidence from a sharp decline in bad loan ratios in a panel of conventional commercial banks in Bangladesh. On the aggregate level, the bad loan ratio in this market has dropped from 41% in 1999 to only 10% in 2012. We find that at a micro level, this dramatic improvement is associated with bank management quality and internal governance that were substantially enhanced during a decade of large-scale regulatory reforms. The bank-level findings persist even after controlling for market monitoring, bank- and industry-level factors, and macroeconomic variables. Both economic growth and financial development paved the way for banks operating in this macroeconomic environment to reduce non-performing loans over time.
DOI
10.1080/1540496X.2018.1523788
Recommended Citation
Amin, A. S., Imam, M. O., & Malik, M. (2019). Regulations, governance, and resolution of non-performing loan: Evidence from an emerging economy. Emerging Markets Finance and Trade, 55(10), 2275-2297. Doi: 10.1080/1540496X.2018.1523788
Comments
Version posted is an original manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in Emerging Markets Finance and Trade. Published online Jan 21, 2019.