Document Type
Article
Publication Date
2009
Abstract
This paper investigates whether reputation-building strategies guide U.S. governors’ state cigarette tax choices, and whether the federal cigarette tax influences such behavior. Using 1975-2000 data, we find evidence that governors in states with relatively important agricultural tobacco production and tobacco manufacturing, and which are densely populated by smokers, appear prone to reputation-building. Moreover, lame ducks are more prone to raise the state cigarette tax the lower the federal tax.
Recommended Citation
Fredriksson, Per G. and Mamun, Khawaja, "Tobacco Politics and Electoral Accountability in the United States" (2009). WCBT Working Papers. 5.
https://digitalcommons.sacredheart.edu/wcob_wp/5
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